Description

Tycon Systems TPDIN-Monitor-WEB3 versions 2.2.9 and prior are vulnerable to a use of hard-coded credential vulnerability. This could allow an attacker to intercept sensitive information or credentials.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-04T21:17:25.710Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-04T21:17:25.710Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Tycon Systems TPDIN-Monitor-WEB3 versions 2.2.9 and prior contain a use of hard-coded credentials vulnerability. This security flaw allows unauthorized entities to gain access to the system by leveraging static, non-changeable authentication tokens embedded within the device firmware or software architecture. The vulnerability poses a significant risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected devices, as attackers do not need to perform traditional password cracking or brute-force attacks to gain administrative control. By exploiting these static credentials, an adversary can authenticate to the device, potentially intercepting sensitive configuration data, sensitive network information, or gaining the ability to modify operational settings. This issue stems from poor security design practices where authentication secrets are insufficiently protected or statically defined, facilitating unauthorized access for any actor with knowledge of the embedded credentials. The risk is critical, particularly for devices deployed in remote or exposed network environments, as successful exploitation enables full device compromise without requiring high levels of technical sophistication.",
  "technicalDetails": "The TPDIN-Monitor-WEB3 device, in versions 2.2.9 and prior, exhibits a fundamental security flaw characterized by the presence of hard-coded credentials within its authentication mechanism. This vulnerability exists because the application relies on static, immutable credentials, such as a default username and password pair or an embedded API key, which are compiled or stored directly within the device's firmware or application logic. Because these credentials cannot be altered or disabled by the end-user through standard administrative interfaces, the device lacks a mechanism for credential rotation or robust secret management.\nThe root cause of this vulnerability lies in the implementation of insecure authentication routines that fail to enforce unique, per-instance secrets. From an exploitation perspective, the attack flow is straightforward. A remote or local attacker, having identified the target as a TPDIN-Monitor-WEB3 device, does not need to perform complex reconnaissance or exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities. Instead, the attacker initiates a standard authentication request via the device's web management interface. By providing the known, hard-coded credentials, the attacker bypasses the intended authentication barrier.\nOnce the authentication handshake is successfully completed, the attacker is granted the same level of access as a legitimate administrator. The post-exploitation impact is severe, as an attacker with administrative privileges can perform a wide range of unauthorized actions, including the modification of network configuration settings, interception of monitoring data, or the deployment of persistent malicious configuration changes. Furthermore, because these credentials are static across the product line, an attacker who extracts the credentials from one device can leverage the same information to compromise all other vulnerable devices in the field. The exposure is largely network-based, meaning any device accessible via a network interface is susceptible to unauthorized login attempts. The vulnerability highlights a failure in secure development lifecycle (SDLC) practices, specifically regarding the handling of sensitive authentication material, which necessitates a complete remediation of the credential verification logic to transition toward user-defined, salted, and hashed credentials."
}