Description

A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Input Validation vulnerability found in UniFi Talk Application to execute a Command Injection on the host device.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "10.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-26T11:16:39.400Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-26T11:16:39.400Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability involves an Improper Input Validation flaw within the UniFi Talk Application, which facilitates Command Injection on the host device.\nThe vulnerability allows a malicious actor who has gained access to the network to bypass security controls by injecting arbitrary commands that are subsequently executed by the underlying operating system with the privileges of the application process.\nThe primary risk implication is the potential for full system compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the network.\nExploitation requires the attacker to have established network reachability to the UniFi Talk service.\nSuccessful exploitation results in unauthorized code execution, posing a critical threat to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected host device.\nUsers and administrators are advised to restrict network access to the application and monitor for anomalous process activity.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from inadequate sanitization and validation of user-supplied input handled by the UniFi Talk Application. When the application processes specific inputs, it fails to sufficiently neutralize shell metacharacters or escape sequences, allowing an attacker to manipulate the execution flow of system-level commands.\nThe root cause is a failure to implement robust input validation mechanisms, such as strict allow-listing or parameterization, before passing input to system-level APIs or shell execution functions (e.g., system(), exec(), or popen()).\nAn attacker with access to the network can exploit this by crafting a malicious payload embedded within the input fields or parameters processed by the UniFi Talk Application. Upon submission, the payload is parsed by the vulnerable component and inadvertently concatenated into a command string that is passed to the host operating system's command interpreter (e.g., /bin/sh or cmd.exe).\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: 1) The attacker identifies the input vector processed by the UniFi Talk Application. 2) The attacker crafts a request containing shell metacharacters (such as backticks, semicolons, or pipe symbols) followed by the desired malicious command. 3) The application, failing to sanitize this input, executes the concatenated string. 4) The underlying OS executes the malicious command with the process's effective UID/GID.\nBecause the UniFi Talk Application often operates with elevated privileges, the successful execution of these injected commands grants the attacker the same level of access as the application service account. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary binaries, modify system configurations, install persistent backdoors, or pivot to other systems on the internal network.\nThe vulnerability is exposed via the network interface used by the UniFi Talk Application. No complex authentication is necessarily required if the vulnerable entry point is accessible without prior authorization, or if the attacker has already gained low-privileged access to the environment. The impact is significant, as command injection provides a direct path to full remote code execution (RCE) on the host device, effectively bypassing higher-level application logic and security constraints."
}