Description

The affected Ebyte device does not restrict repeated authentication attempts through rate limiting or account lockout mechanisms. This could allow an attacker to perform automated authentication attacks against deployments that rely on password based authentication.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-28T00:18:15.190Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-28T00:18:15.190Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The identified vulnerability involves the lack of rate limiting and account lockout mechanisms within Ebyte device authentication processes.\nThis design deficiency allows for unrestricted repeated authentication attempts, rendering password-based authentication susceptible to brute-force and dictionary-style credential stuffing attacks.\nThe vulnerability affects Ebyte hardware products utilizing password-based access control.\nThe primary risk implication is the potential for unauthorized administrative access, which may lead to total device compromise or unauthorized configuration changes.\nAttackers possess the capability to automate login attempts without triggering security alerts or defensive lockdowns, significantly increasing the probability of successful credential discovery.\nNo specific preconditions are required other than network connectivity to the authentication interface, enabling remote exploitation against exposed management endpoints.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the absence of an effective traffic-shaping or state-tracking mechanism within the authentication service of the Ebyte device. The system architecture fails to monitor, log, or restrict successive login requests originating from a single source or targeting a specific account.\nIn a standard deployment, the authentication module accepts credentials, processes the request, and returns an authentication success or failure response. Because the Ebyte firmware does not implement an incrementing counter or temporal delay between failed attempts, the system remains in a perpetually 'ready' state for subsequent input. This lack of stateful monitoring facilitates high-velocity brute-force operations.\nThe attack flow follows a predictable pattern: An attacker initiates a connection to the Ebyte device authentication interface, typically via a web management console or proprietary protocol. The attacker then utilizes automated tooling to inject a high volume of credential combinations against the target endpoint. Because the system does not enforce a lockout period or throttling, the attacker can attempt thousands of combinations in a short timeframe, limited only by network latency and internal system response time.\nThe vulnerability is exposed at the application layer, specifically within the service responsible for validating user credentials. Since there are no defensive circuit breakers—such as Exponential Backoff or permanent/temporary account locks—the system remains vulnerable to credential stuffing attacks where leaked databases from third-party sources can be systematically applied.\nThe network exposure is contingent upon the device's management interface being reachable, either locally or via the internet. If the management console is exposed to an untrusted network, the lack of rate limiting allows for continuous, silent exploitation. Post-exploitation, an attacker gains legitimate session tokens or authorized access, enabling them to modify device configurations, intercept data traffic, or pivot deeper into the network architecture. The impact is critical as it effectively negates the security provided by password-based authentication, reducing the device's defense to the complexity of the chosen password rather than the resiliency of the authentication process."
}