Description

Catapult DCT2000 file parser crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.7 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-19T23:16:19.190Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-19T23:16:19.190Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A denial of service vulnerability exists within the Catapult DCT2000 file parser, specifically affecting versions 4.6.0 to 4.6.7 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18. The vulnerability is triggered when the affected product processes a specially crafted file, resulting in an application crash and subsequent denial of service.\nThis flaw exposes systems utilizing the vulnerable file parser to availability disruptions. An attacker capable of providing a malformed input file to the parsing mechanism can disrupt normal operations, terminate critical processing loops, and render the service unavailable.\nThe risk implication centers on operational downtime and potential service outages in environments dependent on Catapult DCT2000 data ingestion. Exploitation requires the targeted processing of a malicious file format by the vulnerable parser component.\nNo authentication or elevated privileges are inherently required if the parsing mechanism automatically consumes untrusted input from external sources. Remediation requires applying the appropriate vendor-supplied patches or updates to eliminate the parsing logic flaw.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the file parsing component of Catapult DCT2000, specifically impacting versions 4.6.0 through 4.6.7 and 4.4.0 through 4.4.18. The root cause stems from improper input validation and insufficient boundary checks during the parsing of structural elements within the targeted file format.\nWhen the application attempts to ingest and process a maliciously crafted input file, the parser encounters unexpected data structures, malformed headers, or invalid length specifiers. This triggers an unhandled exception, null pointer dereference, or buffer mismanagement within the parsing routine, leading to an immediate abnormal termination of the process.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker constructs a malicious file designed to exploit the parsing logic flaws in the Catapult DCT2000 parser. Second, the crafted file is delivered to the target system through normal operational ingestion channels, batch processing workflows, or direct user interaction where the file parser is invoked.\nThird, the vulnerable Catapult DCT2000 component reads the file contents. As the parser attempts to traverse the malformed segments, memory corruption or logic faults occur due to the lack of robust input sanitization.\nFinally, the runtime environment fails to gracefully handle the parsing error, resulting in a denial of service via application crash. Depending on the deployment architecture, this crash can halt dependent data processing pipelines and require manual service recovery.\nNetwork exposure and authentication requirements depend on how the file parser is integrated into the broader architecture; if the parsing interface accepts automated inputs from external networks or unauthenticated users, the attack surface broadens accordingly. Privilege requirements remain minimal, as the fault is triggered purely through data-plane interactions."
}