Description

MongoSQL Transition Readiness Tool does not sufficiently encode database metadata before including it in generated HTML. A MongoDB user with write access can introduce crafted metadata that may cause script code to run when another user generates and opens the report, potentially exposing report contents or altering its display.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.6",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-28T20:19:54.987Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-28T20:19:54.987Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The MongoSQL Transition Readiness Tool is vulnerable to a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability due to improper output encoding of database metadata. This flaw allows an authenticated MongoDB user with write access to inject malicious scripts into the database. When an administrative or privileged user subsequently generates and views a report, the injected script executes within the context of the victim's session.\nThe primary impact of this vulnerability is the potential for session hijacking, unauthorized access to sensitive report data, and the manipulation of the document object model (DOM) presented to the victim. Exploitation requires the attacker to possess write-level access to the target MongoDB instance, enabling them to poison metadata fields that the reporting engine processes. This constitutes a significant security risk for organizations relying on the integrity of reporting tools, as the exploitation is persistent and executes automatically upon report generation.\nThe vulnerability highlights a critical failure in sanitizing user-controlled input before rendering it in an HTML-based reporting interface. Successful exploitation facilitates lateral movement or information theft by bypassing standard application security controls through client-side script execution.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper handling of data retrieved from the database during the report generation process. The MongoSQL Transition Readiness Tool fails to perform context-aware output encoding on database metadata before embedding these values into the generated HTML output. Consequently, the application interprets user-supplied strings containing JavaScript event handlers or script tags as executable code rather than plain text.\nThe attack flow begins when an attacker, possessing sufficient privileges to modify metadata within the MongoDB database, crafts a malicious payload. This payload typically consists of an HTML script block or an event handler (e.g., <script>alert(document.cookie)</script> or <img src=x onerror=...>). The attacker inserts this payload into a database field that the Transition Readiness Tool is configured to include in its output reports.\nWhen a legitimate user triggers the report generation functionality, the tool queries the contaminated metadata from the database. The application retrieves the raw, unencoded malicious payload and directly injects it into the Document Object Model (DOM) of the generated HTML report. When the victim opens the report in a web browser, the browser parses the injected malicious script and executes it with the privileges of the victim's current session.\nBecause the payload is stored within the database, the XSS is persistent, meaning every user who accesses the generated report becomes a target of the malicious script. The execution occurs entirely on the client-side, circumventing server-side security measures that are not configured to inspect data content for injection vectors. The impact of this post-exploitation behavior includes, but is not limited to, the exfiltration of sensitive report data, the theft of session tokens (facilitating account takeover), and the redirection of the user to malicious external sites.\nGiven that the reporting tool relies on database metadata as a source of truth, the application must implement strict input validation and output encoding to remediate this vector. The vulnerability persists as long as there is an unvalidated trust boundary between the database content and the presentation layer of the reporting engine. Administrative users and users with write access to the underlying metadata are the primary threat actors capable of triggering this vulnerability."
}