Description

In Splunk AI Toolkit versions below 6.0.1, a user who holds the "power" Splunk role could modify app-provided scheduled searches to run arbitrary Search Processing Language (SPL) using the permissions of the search owner, which could allow access to all relevant data and affect system integrity. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk AI Toolkit gives the "power" Splunk role permission to modify scheduled searches that run using the permissions of the search owner.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-19T22:17:26.523Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-19T22:17:26.523Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in the Splunk AI Toolkit affecting versions below 6.0.1. The vulnerability arises due to improper authorization controls, allowing a user assigned the 'power' Splunk role to modify app-provided scheduled searches. This security flaw enables unauthorized execution of arbitrary Search Processing Language (SPL) using the elevated permissions of the search owner. The impact includes potential unauthorized access to all relevant system data and a compromise of overall system integrity. Exploitation requires authenticated access with the 'power' Splunk role and targets the scheduled search modification functionality within the affected application. Mitigating this risk requires updating the Splunk AI Toolkit to version 6.0.1 or higher to ensure proper access controls and permission enforcement are applied to scheduled searches.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the Splunk AI Toolkit in versions prior to 6.0.1, specifically concerning how access controls are enforced on app-provided scheduled searches. The root cause is an overly permissive access control configuration that grants users assigned the 'power' Splunk role the ability to modify scheduled searches that execute with the permissions of the search owner.\nAuthentication and privilege requirements dictate that an attacker must possess authenticated access to the Splunk platform and hold the 'power' role. Network exposure depends on the standard accessibility of the Splunk instance, but the attack is executed through the application's interface or API endpoints responsible for managing scheduled searches.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an authenticated user with the 'power' role identifies an app-provided scheduled search configured to run with elevated privileges (such as those of an administrator or a privileged search owner). Second, leveraging the insecure access controls implemented by the Splunk AI Toolkit, the user modifies the definition of the targeted scheduled search. Third, the user injects arbitrary Search Processing Language (SPL) payloads into the modified scheduled search definition. Fourth, when the scheduled search executes, the underlying Splunk engine runs the injected arbitrary SPL using the context and permissions of the original search owner rather than the modifying user.\nThe post-exploitation impact allows the attacker to bypass standard role-based access restrictions, leveraging the elevated search owner context to access sensitive data, query restricted indices, or otherwise affect system integrity depending on the privileges associated with the search owner account."
}