Description

In Splunk AI Toolkit versions below 6.0.0, a user who does not hold the "admin" or "power" Splunk roles could run searches with system-level privileges, access all relevant data, affect system integrity, and read or delete search jobs belonging to other users through Agent Run History. The improper privilege management is possible because the Agent Run History handler replaces the calling user session key with a system authentication token before it performs search operations. For more information see AI Toolkit Agent Launchpad (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/apply-machine-learning/use-ai-toolkit/6.0.0/ai-toolkit-connections-containers-and-agents/ai-toolkit-agent-launchpad) in the Splunk documentation.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-19T22:17:25.487Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-19T22:17:25.487Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An improper privilege management vulnerability exists in the Splunk AI Toolkit in versions below 6.0.0. The vulnerability allows unprivileged users who lack the \"admin\" or \"power\" Splunk roles to execute searches with system-level privileges through the Agent Run History component. The impact of this security flaw includes unauthorized access to sensitive data, the ability to affect system integrity, and the capability to read or delete search jobs belonging to other users. Attackers require access to the application interface but bypass standard role-based access control mechanisms due to improper session token handling. The risk implication is significant as low-privileged users can inherit elevated system permissions. Remediation requires upgrading the Splunk AI Toolkit to version 6.0.0 or higher.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from improper privilege management within the Agent Run History handler of the Splunk AI Toolkit for versions below 6.0.0. The root cause of the flaw is that the application replaces the calling user session key with an internal system authentication token prior to executing search operations. Consequently, authentication and authorization boundaries enforced by Splunk's role-based access control are bypassed.\nDuring a typical attack flow, a low-privileged user without the \"admin\" or \"power\" Splunk roles interacts with the Agent Run History feature. When a request is processed by the vulnerable component, the backend logic substitutes the authenticated user's session context with elevated system-level credentials. This substitution allows the executing process to inherit unrestricted privileges.\nWith system-level privileges, the attacker can execute arbitrary searches, access all relevant data indexed within the environment, and compromise system integrity. Furthermore, the elevated context grants the user unauthorized capabilities to read or delete active or historical search jobs belonging to other users on the platform. The vulnerability requires local access to the application interface but eliminates the need for prior administrative or power user privileges to achieve privilege escalation."
}