Description

CodeWhale versions before 0.8.64 contain an environment variable exposure vulnerability in the js_execution tool that fails to scrub parent process environment variables before spawning Node.js. Attackers can craft malicious JavaScript code executed by the tool to read process.env and leak API keys, cloud credentials, and authentication tokens back to the model context.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-18T16:18:23.970Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-18T16:18:23.970Z",
  "executiveSummary": "CodeWhale versions before 0.8.64 suffer from an environment variable exposure vulnerability residing within the js_execution tool.\nThe vulnerability involves the failure to scrub parent process environment variables prior to spawning Node.js subprocesses.\nAn attacker capable of injecting or executing malicious JavaScript code via the js_execution tool can leverage this flaw to access process.env.\nThe resulting impact includes the unauthorized leakage of sensitive information such as API keys, cloud credentials, and authentication tokens directly back to the model context.\nThis introduces severe risk implications regarding unauthorized credential disclosure and potential lateral movement or resource compromise within the affected environment.\nExploitation requires the ability to execute crafted JavaScript code through the vulnerable tool, granting the attacker the capability to inspect the runtime environment of the execution context.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from improper handling of process boundaries and environment variable sanitization when the js_execution tool spawns a Node.js runtime environment.\nSpecifically, the root cause is that the spawning mechanism fails to scrub or filter parent process environment variables, allowing the newly created Node.js subprocess to inherit the complete set of environment variables present in the parent process.\nThe vulnerable component is the js_execution tool implemented across CodeWhale versions prior to 0.8.64.\nAttackers exploit this behavior by crafting malicious JavaScript payloads designed to query the global process object, specifically targeting process.env.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: first, the attacker submits or triggers the execution of malicious JavaScript code within the context of the js_execution tool. Second, the tool spawns the Node.js process without stripping inherited environment variables. Third, the malicious script executes and reads sensitive parameters stored within process.env, including API keys, cloud credentials, and authentication tokens. Fourth, the script extracts these credentials and exfiltrates them by returning or logging them back to the model context, where the attacker can harvest them.\nPost-exploitation impact includes full disclosure of high-privilege credentials accessible to the host process, potentially leading to unauthorized access to external services, cloud infrastructures, and authenticated APIs associated with the compromised environment."
}