Description

Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in TÜBİTAK BİLGEM Software Technologies Research Institute Liderahenk allows Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords. This issue affects Liderahenk: before 3.5.5.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-26T14:17:13.080Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-26T14:17:13.080Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical security vulnerability identified as a Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798) exists within the TÜBİTAK BİLGEM Software Technologies Research Institute Liderahenk platform prior to version 3.5.5.\nThis vulnerability exposes the system to unauthorized access by allowing an attacker to authenticate using default or pre-configured credentials embedded within the application codebase.\nThe presence of these hard-coded credentials bypasses standard authentication mechanisms, granting an attacker potential administrative or privileged access to the management console and associated managed endpoints.\nThe risk implication is severe, as successful exploitation enables full control over the Liderahenk deployment, facilitating lateral movement within the network, data exfiltration, or the deployment of arbitrary malicious payloads across managed devices.\nThe vulnerability does not require complex exploitation techniques; an attacker merely needs knowledge of the static credentials or the ability to extract them from the application binaries or configuration files to gain illicit system entry.\nAll instances of Liderahenk running versions prior to 3.5.5 are considered vulnerable and require immediate intervention to remediate the exposure.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from the implementation of static, hard-coded authentication credentials within the Liderahenk codebase. By embedding credentials directly into the application, the software creates a non-configurable, predictable authentication entry point that remains consistent across all installations prior to version 3.5.5.\nRoot Cause Analysis: The failure to implement dynamic authentication mechanisms, such as salted cryptographic hashes generated at runtime or forced password rotation upon initial deployment, leaves the application susceptible to credential exposure. Attackers can recover these static credentials by performing static analysis on application binaries, inspecting internal configuration files, or referencing vendor-provided documentation that may inadvertently disclose default accounts.\nAttack Flow: The exploitation process is straightforward. First, the attacker identifies a network-accessible Liderahenk management interface. Second, the attacker utilizes the discovered hard-coded credentials to initiate an authentication request. Third, because the backend validation logic relies on these hard-coded values, the application authenticates the attacker's session, granting them a security context commensurate with the privileges assigned to the hard-coded account.\nImpact Analysis: Once authenticated, the attacker possesses the same administrative reach as a legitimate system administrator. Given that Liderahenk is designed for centralized management, a compromised account allows for the remote execution of commands on managed nodes, modification of system configurations, and interception of sensitive communication between the management server and client agents.\nAuthentication and Exposure: This vulnerability requires no prior authentication to initiate, as the goal of the exploitation is to bypass the login phase entirely. It is particularly dangerous in network-exposed environments where the management console is reachable via the public internet or an untrusted segment of the internal corporate network. The lack of secondary authentication factors or hardware-backed security controls exacerbates the threat, as the static credentials act as a universal master key for the system.\nPost-Exploitation: After gaining unauthorized access, an attacker may further obscure their presence by creating additional persistent administrative accounts, modifying logs to cover their tracks, or establishing persistent backdoors within the software infrastructure, ensuring continued control even if the original entry point is investigated."
}