Description

OpenViking debug vector scroll and count endpoints apply only account-level scoping without user-level access controls, allowing authenticated users to read all co-tenant records. Attackers can query these endpoints to retrieve private memories, resources, skills, and secret material belonging to other users in the same account without administrative privileges.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-17T21:16:50.477Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-17T21:16:50.477Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An access control vulnerability exists within the OpenViking debug vector scroll and count endpoints. The vulnerability stems from the implementation of account-level scoping exclusively, omitting necessary user-level access controls for fine-grained authorization. This architectural flaw allows any authenticated user within a shared account to read all co-tenant records without requiring administrative privileges. Attackers possessing standard user authentication can leverage this authorization oversight to systematically query the vulnerable endpoints, resulting in the unauthorized extraction of private memories, resources, skills, and sensitive secret material belonging to other users within the same account. The risk implication is significant as it completely undermines tenant isolation at the user level, exposing confidential user-specific data across the entire account boundary. Exploitation requires valid user authentication to the affected system, but operates entirely without the need for elevated administrative privileges or complex privilege escalation chains.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability resides in the authorization logic applied to the OpenViking debug vector scroll and count endpoints. While the application successfully enforces account-level scoping, it fails to implement mandatory user-level access controls or context-aware permission checks. Consequently, when an authenticated user issues requests to the scroll and count endpoints, the underlying query execution layers process the request across the entire account scope rather than filtering data to match the requesting user's specific identifier or security context.\nThe affected components are the debug vector scroll and count endpoints exposed by OpenViking. The network exposure is accessible to any authenticated user interacting with the application interfaces. Attack requirements dictate that the attacker must possess a valid authentication token or session within the target account, but no administrative privileges are required to initiate the attack flow.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the malicious or unauthorized user authenticates to the OpenViking platform using standard credentials, obtaining a valid session or API token. Second, the attacker targets the debug vector scroll and count endpoints, bypassing standard user-interface restrictions by directly interacting with the backend API routes. Third, the attacker issues crafted queries to these endpoints. Because the endpoints enforce only account-level scoping, the backend processes the requests without restricting the record set to the authenticated user's namespace. Fourth, the server returns the requested data payload containing co-tenant records. Finally, the attacker aggregates the responses to harvest private memories, resources, skills, and secret material belonging to other users within the same account.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes the total compromise of confidentiality for user-level data stored within the account boundary. Unauthorized retrieval of private memories, proprietary resources, custom skills, and cryptographic secrets or credentials can facilitate further lateral movement, identity theft, or subsequent compromise of external services reliant on the exposed secret material."
}