Description

In DocSys-master V2.02.85, the downloadDocEx interface in src/com/DocSystem/controller/DocController.java has an arbitrary file read vulnerability:

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-26T22:16:28.980Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-26T22:16:28.980Z",
  "executiveSummary": "DocSys-master V2.02.85 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability located within the downloadDocEx interface.\nThis vulnerability is classified as an improper neutralization of special elements used in a file path, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive data stored on the server's filesystem.\nSuccessful exploitation enables an unauthenticated or authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files, including system configuration files, source code, and potentially sensitive environment credentials.\nThe risk implication is critical, as it bypasses standard access control mechanisms and facilitates information disclosure, which may serve as a precursor to further system compromise, privilege escalation, or remote code execution depending on the content of the retrieved files.\nAttackers can leverage this flaw by manipulating input parameters to traverse directory structures, effectively escaping the intended application directory.\nNo complex exploitation requirements are noted, suggesting that the vulnerability is easily reachable through standard web requests to the specified controller.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the src/com/DocSystem/controller/DocController.java component of the DocSys-master V2.02.85 application, specifically within the downloadDocEx method.\nThe root cause is the insufficient validation and sanitization of user-supplied input intended to define the file path for download operations. By failing to restrict the file path resolution process, the application allows path traversal sequences (such as ../) to be processed by the underlying operating system's filesystem APIs.\nThe attack flow initiates when an attacker sends a crafted request to the downloadDocEx interface. The input parameter—likely intended to specify a legitimate document name or ID—is instead populated with a directory traversal payload. For example, by supplying a path like '../../../../etc/passwd', the attacker can force the application to resolve and serve files located outside the intended application directory.\nBecause the application does not implement adequate chroot-like restrictions or path canonicalization checks, the file retrieval mechanism honors the traversal directives. The server then reads the target file and transmits its contents back to the requester via the HTTP response stream.\nThis behavior exposes the server to severe information disclosure. An attacker can systematically enumerate and download sensitive files including, but not limited to, web configuration files (e.g., web.xml), credential stores, property files containing database connection strings, or system-level configuration files that reveal OS information and user accounts.\nThe impact is significant, as it provides the attacker with deep visibility into the application's internal structure and security configuration, greatly lowering the barrier for subsequent attacks. The vulnerability persists in DocSys-master V2.02.85, and the exposure is typically accessible over the network, allowing remote actors to conduct these operations without requiring specialized privileges unless the underlying web server configuration enforces specific authentication for the controller path."
}