Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: fix integer overflow in bpf_msg_pop_data() bounds check start and len are u32, so u64 last = start + len; evaluates start + len in 32-bit and wraps before storing it in last. The bounds check if (start >= offset + l || last > msg->sg.size) return -EINVAL; can then be passed with an out-of-range start/len, after which the pop loop runs off the end of the scatterlist and sk_msg_shift_left() calls put_page() on the empty msg->sg.end slot: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:sk_msg_shift_left net/core/filter.c:2957 [inline] RIP: 0010:____bpf_msg_pop_data net/core/filter.c:3103 [inline] RIP: 0010:bpf_msg_pop_data+0x753/0x1a10 net/core/filter.c:2984 Call Trace: <TASK> bpf_prog_4cc92c278f4d5d56+0x1b1/0x1e8 bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0x107/0x320 include/linux/filter.h:746 sk_psock_msg_verdict+0x357/0x7f0 net/core/skmsg.c:934 tcp_bpf_send_verdict net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:420 [inline] tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x766/0x1ae0 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:583 __sock_sendmsg+0x153/0x1c0 net/socket.c:802 __sys_sendto+0x326/0x430 net/socket.c:2265 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100 net/socket.c:2268 do_syscall_64+0x14c/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Widen the addition with a (u64) cast so the bound is evaluated in 64-bit and a len near U32_MAX no longer wraps below msg->sg.size. While here, change pop from int to u32. It counts bytes against the unsigned scatterlist lengths and can never be negative, so the signed type only invites sign-confusion in the pop loop.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

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Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.4",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-15T06:22:24.743Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-15T06:22:24.743Z"
}