Description

Authenticated path traversal vulnerabilities exist in API endpoints of AOS-CX. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities allows an attacker to write arbitrary files to the underlying operating system, which could lead to remote code execution.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.2",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-01T21:18:43.287Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-01T21:18:43.287Z",
  "executiveSummary": "AOS-CX is susceptible to authenticated path traversal vulnerabilities residing within its API endpoints. This security flaw enables a remote, authenticated attacker to bypass intended file system restrictions and write arbitrary files to the underlying operating system.\nThe vulnerability type is classified as a Path Traversal (or Directory Traversal) issue. By manipulating input parameters within specific API requests, an adversary can traverse the directory structure outside of the designated application sandbox.\nThe primary risk implication is the potential for Remote Code Execution (RCE). By writing files to sensitive locations—such as startup scripts, configuration directories, or binary paths—an attacker can gain unauthorized system-level control over the affected network appliance.\nThe exploitation of this vulnerability necessitates a valid session with the device, meaning the attacker must already possess authenticated access to the API. This implies that the threat vector is primarily focused on compromised accounts or insider threats. Once successfully exploited, the attacker transitions from a restricted API user to an OS-level actor, fundamentally compromising the integrity and availability of the networking hardware.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from insufficient validation and sanitization of user-supplied input strings passed to API endpoints within AOS-CX. The application fails to properly neutralize character sequences like '../' (dot-dot-slash) or encoded variations that allow navigation outside of the intended web root or application directory.\nThe root cause is an insecure implementation of file I/O operations where path assembly relies on concatenated user input without robust path canonicalization. When the API handler processes a request, it fails to perform a 'jail' check or verify that the destination path remains within a restricted directory scope.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker establishes a valid authenticated session with the AOS-CX API. Second, the attacker identifies a vulnerable endpoint that interacts with the file system. Third, the attacker crafts a malicious request where the input parameter contains path traversal sequences to reach a target location on the underlying Linux-based operating system. Fourth, the server-side logic processes the request, resolves the traversal path, and performs a write operation to the attacker-defined destination.\nThe exploitation method leverages this write primitive to overwrite critical system files. For example, by overwriting a shell initialization script or a service configuration file, the attacker ensures that their malicious code or commands are executed the next time the relevant system service or shell is triggered. This effectively grants the attacker persistence and elevated execution privileges.\nThe vulnerable components are the API endpoint handlers responsible for processing file uploads or configuration write requests. Because AOS-CX operates on a centralized management architecture, the ability to write arbitrary files is catastrophic. A successful exploit does not merely result in local file modification but provides a pathway to full device takeover, potentially allowing for traffic interception, configuration exfiltration, or the disruption of network services provided by the switch.\nThis vulnerability is constrained by the necessity of authentication, meaning it is not directly exploitable from the unauthenticated public internet. However, once the initial barrier of authentication is breached, the lack of OS-level process sandboxing allows the exploit to escalate privileges from the application layer to the root or system-level execution context of the underlying AOS-CX operating system."
}