Description

SiYuan's development branch (endpoint introduced by commit 9b8e8956f, not present in v3.7.3 or master, patched in v3.7.4) contains a missing-authorization vulnerability in the /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget endpoint. The route is registered with CheckAuth only and performs no authorization checks (no CheckReadonly, no publish-access or encrypted-notebook gating). Given a database identifier taken from a published page and a keyword, an anonymous reader can query the endpoint to retrieve matching database row content, including rows that publish filters (FilterAttributeViewByPublishAccess) would otherwise withhold. No released stable version is affected.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.6",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-13T12:17:25.323Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-13T12:17:25.323Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A missing-authorization vulnerability was identified in the development branch of SiYuan, specifically within the /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget endpoint introduced by commit 9b8e8956f. This security flaw stems from insufficient access control enforcement, as the route is registered solely with a generic authentication check (CheckAuth) and lacks critical authorization mechanisms such as CheckReadonly, publish-access validation, and encrypted-notebook gating. Consequently, unauthenticated or unauthorized remote attackers can bypass intended access restrictions to query and retrieve sensitive database row content. The vulnerability impacts development builds preceding version v3.7.4, while stable releases such as v3.7.3 and the main master branch remain unaffected. The risk implications include the unauthorized disclosure of confidential data, as the flaw allows malicious actors to harvest database records—including rows that should normally be withheld by publish filters (FilterAttributeViewByPublishAccess). Exploitation requires network access to the target SiYuan instance, knowledge of a valid database identifier obtained from a published page, and a specific search keyword, enabling automated data exfiltration without requiring elevated privileges.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the backend routing and controller logic of SiYuan's attribute view search functionality. Specifically, the endpoint /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget was introduced in the development branch via commit 9b8e8956f. The root cause of the vulnerability is an incomplete authorization implementation during route registration. While the endpoint incorporates a basic authentication middleware check (CheckAuth), it completely omits granular authorization controls required for sensitive operations, such as CheckReadonly enforcement, publish-access validation, and encrypted-notebook access gating.\nUnder normal operational security controls, database queries and attribute view lookups intended for public consumption are governed by publish filters—such as FilterAttributeViewByPublishAccess—which restrict visibility and ensure that unauthorized users cannot access restricted or private database rows. Because the /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget endpoint fails to invoke these security functions and relies exclusively on generic authentication checks, an anonymous or low-privileged remote attacker can interact directly with the endpoint over the network.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker identifies a valid database identifier by inspecting a legitimate published page generated by the SiYuan application. Second, the attacker formulates an HTTP request targeted at the /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget endpoint, supplying the harvested database identifier alongside an arbitrary search keyword. Third, the backend processes the request without validating whether the requester possesses read permissions for the target notebook, whether the notebook is encrypted, or whether the targeted rows are permitted to bypass publish filters. Finally, the endpoint responds by returning matching database row content directly to the attacker, bypassing all intended confidentiality boundaries and exposing restricted data structures."
}