Description

A flaw was found in sblim-sfcb. A local attacker with access to the system can exploit an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the provider-manager's inter-process communication (IPC) message parsing. By sending a specially crafted message, the attacker can cause out-of-bounds memory access, leading to the termination of the provider-manager process and a denial of service. This could also potentially result in limited unintended information disclosure.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.6",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-13T13:19:18.497Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-13T13:19:18.497Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An unsafe deserialization vulnerability exists within the provider-manager component of sblim-sfcb. This flaw allows a local attacker with system access to exploit inter-process communication (IPC) message parsing mechanisms. By transmitting a specially crafted message to the vulnerable service, the adversary can induce out-of-bounds memory access conditions during the parsing phase. The primary impact of this exploitation is a complete denial of service resulting from the forced termination of the provider-manager process. Additionally, the out-of-bounds memory read condition creates a vector for limited, unintended information disclosure, potentially leaking sensitive memory contents to unauthorized local processes. Exploitation of this vulnerability requires local system access to interact with the IPC channel used by sblim-sfcb. The risk implications include service disruption and potential reconnaissance capabilities via memory leakage, affecting system availability and confidentiality on compromised hosts.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the provider-manager component of sblim-sfcb, specifically within the inter-process communication (IPC) message parsing routines. The root cause stems from unsafe deserialization and insufficient bounds checking when handling incoming IPC messages. When the provider-manager parses structured data or serialized objects transmitted across the IPC boundary, it fails to properly validate the length and structural integrity of the input fields against allocated memory buffers.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, a local attacker leverages system access to establish communication with the sblim-sfcb provider-manager via its designated IPC channel. Second, the attacker crafts a malicious payload containing corrupted or manipulated serialized data designed to deceive the message parser regarding data boundaries and sizes. Third, the attacker sends this specially crafted IPC message to the provider-manager process. Fourth, upon receiving the message, the vulnerable parsing routine attempts to deserialize the payload without enforcing adequate validation checks. Fifth, the miscalculation of offsets during the processing of the malicious structures results in an out-of-bounds memory access violation.\nThis out-of-bounds memory access triggers an immediate segmentation fault or critical exception, abruptly terminating the provider-manager process and precipitating a denial of service condition for dependent management operations. Furthermore, depending on the specific memory locations read during the erroneous parsing operation, the vulnerability can expose adjacent memory contents, leading to limited unintended information disclosure. Authentication and privilege requirements are limited to local system access, enabling any standard user or process capable of communicating with the IPC interface to trigger the flaw. The attack vector is strictly local, as IPC channels are not inherently exposed across the network without intermediary forwarding mechanisms."
}