Description

A flaw was found in the multicloud-operators-channel component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management (RHACM). This vulnerability allows a compromised agent from a managed cluster to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information. Specifically, the agent can read all Secrets and ConfigMaps within any Channel namespace on the hub, potentially exposing credentials for other tenants' Git and Helm repositories. This could lead to significant information disclosure.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-12T02:16:38.330Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-12T02:16:38.330Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical unauthorized information disclosure vulnerability has been identified within the multicloud-operators-channel component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management (RHACM). This security flaw permits a compromised agent originating from a managed cluster to bypass authorization boundaries and gain unauthorized read access to sensitive cluster resources. Specifically, the affected agent can retrieve all Secrets and ConfigMaps residing within any Channel namespace located on the hub cluster.\nThe potential impact of this vulnerability is severe, as the exposed Secrets and ConfigMaps frequently contain sensitive authentication material, including credentials for other tenants' Git and Helm repositories. An attacker who has compromised a managed cluster agent can leverage these exposed credentials to pivot across multi-tenant environments, potentially compromising external repositories and connected infrastructure.\nThe attack vector relies on compromised agent capabilities within the managed cluster ecosystem, which subsequently abuse overly permissive access controls on the hub cluster's Channel namespaces. Exploitation requires prior compromise of a managed cluster agent to interact with the multicloud-operators-channel component, after which the adversary can systematically harvest sensitive credentials and configuration data without triggering standard access restrictions.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the multicloud-operators-channel component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management (RHACM), specifically within the authorization and namespace scoping logic governing interactions between managed cluster agents and the hub cluster. The root cause stems from insufficient access control enforcement, which fails to properly restrict the operational scope of managed cluster agents.\nUnder normal operating conditions, agents deployed on managed clusters require limited access to synchronize resources via designated channels. However, due to the flaw in the multicloud-operators-channel component, a compromised agent can issue API requests that transcend its intended administrative boundaries. The vulnerable component improperly permits these agents to read arbitrary Kubernetes Secrets and ConfigMaps across any Channel namespace instantiated on the hub cluster.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker compromises an agent operating within a managed cluster, gaining control over its local execution context and API client capabilities. Second, the attacker utilizes the compromised agent to send read requests targeting Channel namespaces on the hub cluster. Third, due to the lack of strict namespace isolation and privilege validation within the multicloud-operators-channel component, the hub cluster processes and fulfills the requests. Fourth, the agent receives the contents of sensitive Secrets and ConfigMaps belonging to other tenants or channels.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes the extraction of high-value authentication artifacts. Because Channel namespaces commonly store repository synchronization parameters, the harvested Secrets and ConfigMaps frequently contain plaintext or weakly encoded credentials for external Git and Helm repositories. Armed with these credentials, the attacker achieves cross-tenant information exposure and can potentially compromise external software supply chains and proprietary codebases associated with other tenants managed by the RHACM hub."
}