Description

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, the dockerImage field is interpolated without quoting into shell commands in buildRemoteDocker() in packages/server/src/utils/providers/docker.ts and is validated only as an optional string. An authenticated user with application create or update permission can use shell command substitution in dockerImage to execute arbitrary commands on the local build host or a remote SSH build target, exposing host secrets and other projects. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.6",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-10T20:17:34.133Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-10T20:17:34.133Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A command injection vulnerability exists in Dokploy prior to version 0.29.13.\nThe vulnerability resides in the buildRemoteDocker function located within packages/server/src/utils/providers/docker.ts, where the dockerImage field is interpolated directly into shell commands without proper quoting or input sanitization.\nAn authenticated attacker with application create or update permissions can leverage shell command substitution techniques via the dockerImage parameter to achieve arbitrary command execution.\nSuccessful exploitation allows malicious actors to execute arbitrary commands on the local build host or a designated remote SSH build target.\nThe resulting impact includes the exposure of sensitive host secrets, cross-project compromise, and potential full system takeover within the PaaS environment.\nRemediation requires upgrading Dokploy to version 0.29.13 or later, where proper validation and sanitization of the dockerImage field are implemented.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability is caused by improper neutralization of special elements used in a command, commonly categorized as command injection.\nThe vulnerable component is identified as the buildRemoteDocker function within packages/server/src/utils/providers/docker.ts.\nPrior to version 0.29.13, the input vector is the dockerImage field, which is validated merely as an optional string without enforcing strict character sets or structural constraints.\nDuring the build execution phase, the application programmatically constructs shell commands by directly interpolating the unquoted dockerImage string into the command execution context.\nBecause shell interpolation occurs without quoting or escaping, an authenticated user possessing application create or update permissions can supply malicious input containing shell command substitution syntax, such as backticks or dollar-parentheses sequences.\nWhen the buildRemoteDocker function processes the payload, the underlying shell interprets the injected syntax and executes the attacker-supplied commands directly on the host operating system or the configured remote SSH build target.\nThe required attacker capabilities involve authentication against the Dokploy platform with specific authorization levels, specifically application creation or modification privileges.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes arbitrary code execution within the security context of the build host or remote SSH target, leading to the potential theft of environment variables, API keys, host secrets, and unauthorized access to data belonging to other projects hosted on the same infrastructure."
}