Description

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, the local branch of /docker-container-terminal in apps/dokploy/server/wss/docker-container-terminal.ts authenticates with validateRequest but does not authorize the attacker-controlled containerId against the caller's role, organization, or service access before passing it to `docker exec`, allowing any authenticated member to obtain a root shell in arbitrary containers on a self-hosted instance. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.9",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-10T19:17:35.010Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-10T19:17:35.010Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Dokploy prior to version 0.29.13 suffers from an authorization bypass vulnerability within its WebSocket-based terminal management component. Specifically, the local branch of /docker-container-terminal in apps/dokploy/server/wss/docker-container-terminal.ts performs session authentication via validateRequest but completely fails to enforce authorization checks against the attacker-controlled containerId parameter.\nConsequently, any authenticated user can bypass access controls and supply arbitrary container identifiers. This flaw allows malicious or compromised low-privileged members to gain unauthorized access to underlying Docker containers managed by the self-hosted instance.\nThe impact of this vulnerability is critical, as successful exploitation grants the attacker a root shell inside arbitrary containers on the host system. This exposes sensitive application data, facilitates lateral movement, and compromises the integrity and confidentiality of the entire self-hosted PaaS infrastructure.\nExploitation requires active authentication to the Dokploy platform, meaning an attacker must possess valid credentials or session tokens. However, no administrative privileges are required, as standard members can leverage the flaw. Remediation requires updating Dokploy to version 0.29.13 or later, where proper authorization logic is enforced.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the WebSocket handling logic implemented within apps/dokploy/server/wss/docker-container-terminal.ts, specifically affecting the local branch responsible for managing the /docker-container-terminal functionality.\nThe root cause of the vulnerability is a missing authorization check following successful request authentication. While the endpoint correctly invokes the validateRequest function to verify that the incoming WebSocket connection originates from an authenticated session, it fails to validate whether the caller possesses the necessary permissions, role, organization membership, or service access to interact with the specified container.\nDuring the execution flow, the application accepts an attacker-controlled containerId parameter directly from the client via the WebSocket communication channel. Without validating this identifier against the caller's authorized scope, the server passes the unverified containerId directly into underlying execution routines such as docker exec.\nStep-by-step, the attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an authenticated attacker establishes a WebSocket connection to the vulnerable /docker-container-terminal endpoint. Second, the server successfully authenticates the transport session using validateRequest. Third, the attacker transmits a crafted WebSocket message containing a containerId belonging to another user, organization, or a restricted administrative service. Fourth, the application bypasses access control validation and executes a command execution routine targeting the specified container. Finally, the attacker interacts with the resulting interactive session, successfully obtaining a root shell within the target container.\nThe affected component is the Docker container terminal WebSocket handler in Dokploy prior to version 0.29.13. The vulnerability requires network exposure of the Dokploy server, valid user authentication credentials, and exploits the lack of contextual authorization checks on container management operations. The resulting post-exploitation impact includes full root-level code execution inside arbitrary containers, potentially leading to total system compromise depending on container isolation configurations."
}