Description

Budibase before 3.40.0 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the chat-link handoff endpoint that allows attackers to bind an external chat identity to a victim's account. Attackers can craft a phishing page that auto-submits a POST request with a leaked confirmation token to bind their chat identity to a victim user's account, enabling impersonation within agent operations and inheritance of victim permissions.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-13T22:17:24.140Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-13T22:17:24.140Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Budibase before 3.40.0 suffers from a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability residing within the chat-link handoff endpoint.\nThe vulnerability allows an unauthenticated or remote attacker to craft a malicious phishing page designed to automatically submit a forged HTTP POST request.\nBy leveraging a leaked confirmation token, the payload successfully binds an attacker-controlled external chat identity to a victim user's account.\nSuccessful exploitation compromises the integrity of user accounts, enabling the attacker to achieve impersonation within agent operations and inherit the victim's assigned permissions.\nThe flaw introduces significant risk implications regarding unauthorized access escalation and identity spoofing within collaborative agent workflows.\nExploitation requires user interaction, specifically the victim accessing an attacker-controlled web page while authenticated to the vulnerable Budibase instance.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from insufficient CSRF protection on the chat-link handoff endpoint within Budibase before 3.40.0.\nThe vulnerable component handles external chat identity linking operations through HTTP POST requests.\nDue to the lack of robust request verification mechanisms, such as anti-CSRF tokens or SameSite cookie policies strictly enforced on sensitive state-changing operations, the endpoint accepts requests originating from arbitrary external domains.\nThe attack flow initiates when an attacker obtains or leaks a confirmation token associated with the chat-link handoff process.\nThe attacker then hosts a specially crafted phishing page containing JavaScript designed to auto-submit a forged POST request targeting the chat-link handoff endpoint.\nWhen a victim user, authenticated to the Budibase application, navigates to the malicious phishing page, the browser automatically includes the victim's session cookies along with the auto-submitted POST payload containing the confirmation token.\nUpon processing the request, the application binds the attacker's external chat identity to the victim's account without explicit user consent or secondary validation.\nPost-exploitation impact includes complete account impersonation during agent operations, allowing the attacker to execute actions under the security context of the victim and inherit all associated permissions and privileges within the Budibase environment."
}