Description

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). In 0.29.8 and earlier, backup.create, backup.update, and backup.restoreBackupWithLogs in apps/dokploy/server/api/routers/backup.ts accept a client-controlled destinationId and use the referenced destination without verifying that destination.organizationId equals ctx.session.activeOrganizationId. An authenticated member with backup permissions for a service in one organization can cause another organization's S3 accessKey and secretAccessKey to be materialized by packages/server/src/utils/backups/utils.ts getS3Credentials on the attacker's service host, read that organization's backup objects, or redirect and poison backups across tenant boundaries.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.6",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-10T18:18:52.280Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-10T18:18:52.280Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A cross-tenant authorization bypass vulnerability exists in Dokploy versions 0.29.8 and earlier, specifically within the backup management procedures of the tRPC API router.\nThe vulnerability stems from inadequate access control validation when processing client-controlled destination identifiers within backup operations, allowing an authenticated tenant to interact with S3 backup destinations belonging to entirely different organizations.\nAn attacker possessing valid authentication and backup permissions within a single service in one organization can exploit this flaw to materialize sensitive S3 access keys and secret access keys on their own controlled service host, read external organization backup objects, or poison backup routines across tenant boundaries.\nThis introduces severe multi-tenant isolation risks, exposing sensitive cloud storage credentials and backup payloads to unauthorized cross-organization actors.\nSuccessful exploitation requires authenticated access to the platform with baseline backup permissions, after which the attacker can manipulate API parameters to bypass organizational isolation barriers.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability resides in the tRPC router implementation located at apps/dokploy/server/api/routers/backup.ts, specifically within the backup.create, backup.update, and backup.restoreBackupWithLogs procedures.\nThese functions accept a client-controlled parameter designated as destinationId and utilize the referenced destination object directly without enforcing a strict security check to verify that the destination.organizationId matches the active session context defined by ctx.session.activeOrganizationId.\nDue to this missing tenant isolation check, an authenticated user can supply an arbitrary destinationId belonging to a victim organization.\nDuring the execution of the affected backup procedures, the backend invokes packages/server/src/utils/backups/utils.ts getS3Credentials, which resolves and materializes the S3 accessKey and secretAccessKey associated with the targeted external destination.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker authenticates to the Dokploy platform with standard member privileges and backup permissions within their own organization. Second, the attacker crafts an API request targeting backup.create, backup.update, or backup.restoreBackupWithLogs, supplying a foreign destinationId gathered or guessed from another tenant. Third, the backend processes the request without validating organizational ownership, passing the foreign destination reference to the utility functions. Fourth, packages/server/src/utils/backups/utils.ts retrieves the S3 credentials of the victim organization and materializes them on the attacker's service host. Finally, the attacker leverages these exposed credentials to read sensitive backup objects or manipulate the backup workflow to execute poisoning attacks across tenant boundaries.\nThe affected component spans the API routing layer in apps/dokploy/server/api/routers/backup.ts and the credential retrieval utility in packages/server/src/utils/backups/utils.ts.\nThe affected software versions include Dokploy 0.29.8 and all earlier releases.\nExploitation requires authentication and specific backup permissions, but bypasses all horizontal privilege boundaries between distinct organizational tenants."
}