Description

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in automatisch through commit 41f3c56 allows a low-privileged authenticated user with 'manage Flow' permission to make the server fetch arbitrary URLs and retrieve the full response body via the HTTP Request app's Custom Request action. The packages/backend/src/apps/http-request/actions/custom-request/index.js handler passes the user-supplied URL directly to the HTTP client with no SSRF controls, enabling access to internal services and metadata endpoints.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-10T11:17:29.100Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-10T11:17:29.100Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An unmitigated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the automatisch application through commit 41f3c56. The security flaw resides within the HTTP Request app's Custom Request action, allowing low-privileged authenticated users possessing the 'manage Flow' permission to coerce the server into issuing arbitrary outbound HTTP requests. By supplying maliciously crafted URLs, an attacker can bypass network perimeters to query internal services, local network resources, and cloud provider metadata endpoints.\nThe successful exploitation of this vulnerability yields full HTTP response bodies back to the authenticated user, potentially exposing sensitive internal application data, infrastructure topology, and cloud instance secrets. This poses severe risk implications, including lateral movement within internal networks and unauthorized access to restricted internal microservices. Exploitation requires authenticated access with specific low-privileged workflow management permissions, restricting the initial attack vector to internal threat actors or compromised user accounts.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from inadequate input validation and the complete absence of Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) controls within the backend request handling logic. Specifically, the vulnerable component is located in the file packages/backend/src/apps/http-request/actions/custom-request/index.js. The HTTP request handler directly accepts user-supplied URL parameters and passes them straight to the underlying HTTP client without performing domain whitelisting, IP address filtering, or private IP space blocking.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker authenticates to the automatisch platform with a low-privileged account that holds the 'manage Flow' permission. Second, the attacker constructs or modifies a workflow utilizing the HTTP Request app, specifically configuring the Custom Request action. Third, the attacker inputs a targeted internal URL, such as a cloud provider metadata service endpoint (e.g., 169.254.169.254) or an internal database management interface, instead of a legitimate external web address. Fourth, upon execution of the flow, the backend server initiates an outbound TCP connection and HTTP GET or POST request to the specified internal target on behalf of the application.\nFinally, the backend captures the complete response payload returned by the internal resource and transmits the full response body back through the application interface to the attacker. This mechanism effectively turns the automatisch server into a proxy for internal network reconnaissance and data exfiltration. The vulnerability impacts automatisch through commit 41f3c56, requiring network exposure of the backend service and valid user credentials with workflow management capabilities."
}