Description

A flaw was found in insights-client. A compromised managed cluster, referred to as a 'spoke', can inject unencoded data into the Insights API URL path. This occurs because the ClusterID, which is controlled by the spoke, is used directly in the request path without proper validation or URL encoding. This vulnerability allows a malicious spoke to redirect authenticated requests to unintended API endpoints, potentially leading to information disclosure or unauthorized access.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T20:18:45.673Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T20:18:45.673Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A path injection vulnerability has been identified in insights-client, specifically affecting managed clusters referred to as spokes. The flaw arises from the direct incorporation of the attacker-controlled ClusterID into the Insights API request path without prior validation or proper URL encoding. This security deficiency allows a compromised managed spoke cluster to manipulate the URL path of outgoing HTTP requests.\nBy injecting unencoded characters or path traversal sequences into the ClusterID, a malicious spoke can successfully redirect authenticated API requests to unintended endpoints within the target infrastructure. The primary impact of this vulnerability includes potential information disclosure of sensitive data and unauthorized access to restricted API resources.\nExploitation of this flaw requires a compromised managed spoke cluster capable of controlling its designated ClusterID parameter. The risk implication is significant within multi-tenant or hub-and-spoke architectures where compromised downstream components can leverage their authenticated session to pivot against upstream management APIs. Remediation requires enforcing strict input validation, sanitization, and comprehensive URL encoding of the ClusterID prior to path construction.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from improper input handling and lack of output encoding within the insights-client codebase, specifically where the ClusterID is concatenated directly into the HTTP request path targeting the Insights API. The vulnerable component utilizes the ClusterID—an identifier fully controlled and supplied by the managed spoke cluster—without validating its syntactic correctness or applying percent-encoding (URL encoding) to neutralize special characters.\nIn a standard operational workflow, the managed spoke authenticates to the central management infrastructure and periodically communicates status and telemetry data to the Insights API using a constructed URL path that incorporates its unique ClusterID. Because the client application trusts this identifier, an attacker controlling a spoke cluster can provision a crafted or malformed ClusterID containing URI path separators, query parameters, or dot-dot traversal sequences.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker compromises or maliciously provisions a spoke cluster and assigns it a specially crafted payload as its ClusterID. Second, the insights-client running on or communicating on behalf of the spoke initiates a routine synchronization or data submission request to the Insights API. Third, during request formulation, the application interpolates the unvalidated ClusterID directly into the target URL path string. Fourth, the HTTP client executes the request, where the injected path characters alter the intended routing destination on the receiving API server. Finally, because the request originates from a legitimately authenticated spoke, the API gateway or receiving endpoint processes the request under that context, permitting access to unintended API paths, exposing confidential information, or triggering unauthorized state changes."
}