Description

Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Microsoft Copilot in Azure allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.7",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-20T22:18:01.003Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-20T22:18:01.003Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in Microsoft Copilot in Azure, posing significant risk to internal network security and data confidentiality.\nThe vulnerability allows an authorized attacker to trigger unauthorized outbound network requests from the affected server-side component, leading to sensitive information disclosure.\nThe affected product is Microsoft Copilot in Azure. Exploitation of this flaw enables adversaries to interact with internal or external network resources that are normally inaccessible from the client boundary.\nThe primary risk implication is the potential exposure of internal infrastructure details, metadata service data, or restricted application programming interfaces (APIs) accessible within the hosting environment.\nTo successfully execute an attack, the threat actor must possess authorized access to the service interface, allowing them to supply crafted inputs that manipulate the target's internal request routing mechanisms.\nThe vulnerability undermines network boundary assumptions by abusing the application's native functionality to proxy requests toward arbitrary destinations, thereby bypassing perimeter security controls.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the request handling logic of Microsoft Copilot in Azure, specifically in components responsible for fetching remote resources or interacting with external endpoints based on user-supplied parameters.\nThe root cause stems from insufficient validation, sanitization, and parsing of user-controlled input utilized to construct outbound HTTP or network requests.\nDue to the lack of strict allowlisting or proper Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) parsing, the application fails to adequately restrict destinations to intended, trusted external entities.\nAn authorized attacker initiates the attack flow by submitting a maliciously crafted payload containing a targeted internal or external URL through the accessible service interface.\nUpon receiving the input, the vulnerable server-side component processes the URI and initiates an outbound network connection on behalf of the application without enforcing adequate egress filtering or network segmentation checks.\nThe underlying protocol handling allows the resolution of arbitrary domains, loopback addresses, or link-local IP spaces, facilitating internal reconnaissance and interaction with internal services.\nThe attack requires prior authorization to interact with Microsoft Copilot in Azure, meaning the adversary operates with authenticated privileges within the service context.\nNetwork exposure is inherent to the service architecture, as the application legitimately requires outbound connectivity to function, which is subsequently abused to pivot traffic toward unintended targets.\nThe payload behavior forces the server to execute requests against sensitive internal endpoints, such as cloud metadata services, internal microservices, or backend data stores.\nThe post-exploitation impact centers on unauthorized information disclosure, where responses from the internally targeted resources are captured and potentially reflected back to the attacker or leaked through application channels, exposing confidential configuration data, internal network topologies, or sensitive application state."
}