Description

Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure Virtual Machines allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-20T22:18:00.270Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-20T22:18:00.270Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists within Azure Virtual Machines, specifically enabling an authorized malicious actor to facilitate unauthorized privilege escalation across a network infrastructure.\nThis security flaw impacts Azure Virtual Machines, exposing the underlying cloud architecture and internal management endpoints to potential abuse.\nThe primary risk implication involves boundary bypass, allowing attackers who possess initial authorization within the environment to query internal resources that should otherwise be restricted from network access.\nThe attacker capabilities required to leverage this vulnerability include prior network authorization, which is subsequently utilized to manipulate request processing within the virtual machine boundary.\nSuccessful exploitation compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive cloud metadata services and internal endpoints, potentially granting the adversary elevated access rights across the affected network scope.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation and sanitization within the request-handling mechanisms of Azure Virtual Machines, manifesting as a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw.\nThe affected component handles outbound HTTP or network requests initiated by or routed through the virtual machine infrastructure without properly restricting destinations to external or safe IP spaces.\nThe attack vector requires the adversary to have a baseline level of authorization to interact with the vulnerable service or application running within the Azure Virtual Machines environment.\nThe step-by-step attack flow begins with the authorized attacker crafting a malicious payload containing a specially formulated Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) or IP address pointing to sensitive internal endpoints, such as the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) or internal microservices.\nUpon submission, the vulnerable component processes the untrusted input and dispatches a backend request to the targeted internal resource on behalf of the attacker.\nBecause the request originates from the trusted context of the virtual machine or its associated management plane, the internal target accepts the connection and returns privileged data or executes unauthorized commands.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes the retrieval of sensitive configuration data, authentication tokens, or cloud credentials exposed via metadata endpoints, which the attacker can subsequently leverage to achieve full privilege escalation and lateral movement across the network.\nNetwork exposure encompasses internal routing paths accessible from the virtual machine execution context, bypassing perimeter security controls through trusted server-side request channels."
}