Description

Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure Data Factory allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.6",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-20T22:17:56.043Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-20T22:17:56.043Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in Azure Data Factory. This security flaw allows an unauthorized remote attacker to manipulate the application into initiating unintended outbound network requests to arbitrary destinations. By exploiting this vulnerability, threat actors can leverage the trust relationship of the hosting server to probe internal network resources, bypass perimeter network controls, and disclose sensitive information that would otherwise be inaccessible from the external network perimeter. The risk implications are severe, as successful exploitation potentially exposes internal microservices, metadata endpoints, and backend infrastructure to unauthorized access and information leakage. The attack requires network connectivity to the vulnerable Azure Data Factory instance and does not rely on prior authentication or privileged access to execute the request forgery payload, lowering the overall exploitation barrier for malicious actors targeting cloud-based data integration pipelines.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation and sanitization of user-supplied URIs or parameters within the Azure Data Factory component responsible for handling remote resource fetching or data connector integration. When a client submits a crafted request containing a malicious Uniform Resource Identifier, the application fails to restrict or validate the destination address against a secure whitelist before initiating the outbound connection.\nThe exploitation method involves an attacker crafting an HTTP request or data integration payload containing an internal IP address, loopback address, or a metadata service URL instead of the expected external endpoint. Upon processing the input, the vulnerable component acts as an unwitting proxy, dispatching the request from the internal context of the Azure Data Factory server infrastructure.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker identifies an input vector within Azure Data Factory that accepts remote URLs or external resource references. Second, the attacker formulates an SSRF payload targeting internal assets, such as cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254) or internal network services residing behind the firewall. Third, the attacker transmits the malicious request to the target Azure Data Factory endpoint. Fourth, the server processes the input and executes an outbound network request using its own network privileges. Finally, the response from the internal resource is either directly reflected back to the attacker or leveraged to infer the existence and state of internal network infrastructure.\nThe vulnerable component involves the server-side request handling and data retrieval subsystems of Azure Data Factory. Exploitation can be performed by unauthorized attackers over the network without requiring any prior authentication or special privileges, significantly amplifying the severity of the flaw within cloud environments."
}