Description

A flaw was found in the `submariner-operator` component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes. This vulnerability allows a cluster administrator, or any user with permissions to modify the Submariner Custom Resource (CR), to specify an unvalidated image path. This lack of validation enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges across the entire cluster, including control-plane nodes, by deploying a malicious image.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.2",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-18T17:17:00.840Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-18T17:17:00.840Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical vulnerability has been identified within the submariner-operator component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes. This security flaw stems from insufficient input validation when processing the Submariner Custom Resource (CR), allowing authenticated actors with specific resource modification permissions to supply arbitrary image paths. The primary impact of this vulnerability is arbitrary code execution with highly elevated privileges spanning the entire Kubernetes cluster, including sensitive control-plane nodes. The risk implications are severe, as successful exploitation compromises the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the entire multi-cluster or single-cluster orchestration environment. Attacker capabilities rely on possessing cluster administrator privileges or permissions strictly localized to modifying the Submariner Custom Resource. Exploitation requirements mandate that the attacker can interact with the Kubernetes API server to craft or alter the targeted Custom Resource definitions with a malicious container image path, thereby bypassing intended operational boundaries and leveraging the operator's execution context to compromise underlying infrastructure nodes.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the submariner-operator component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes, specifically within the logic that parses and deploys workloads based on user-supplied parameters in the Submariner Custom Resource (CR). The root cause of the issue is an improper validation vulnerability where the controller accepts unvalidated image paths directly from the CR specification without enforcing strict allowlisting or registry verification mechanisms.\nThe exploitation method involves an authenticated user with permissions to create or modify the Submariner Custom Resource injecting a reference to a malicious container image into the image path parameters of the resource manifest. Upon submission, the submariner-operator reconciles the Custom Resource and provisions the specified workload across the cluster nodes, treating the attacker-supplied image as a legitimate operational component.\nThe attack flow proceeds in sequential phases. First, the attacker authenticates to the Kubernetes API server using credentials that grant modification rights to the Submariner Custom Resource. Second, the attacker crafts a malicious Custom Resource manifest containing the path to a maliciously crafted container image hosted within an accessible container registry. Third, the attacker applies this manifest to the cluster. Fourth, the submariner-operator detects the resource modification and initiates the deployment of the defined components. Finally, because the operator typically operates with elevated permissions and provisions workloads across worker and control-plane nodes, the malicious container executes with high privileges, granting the attacker arbitrary code execution across the cluster infrastructure.\nThe vulnerable component is the submariner-operator within Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes. Authentication requirements dictate that the attacker must possess valid credentials to the Kubernetes API server. Privilege requirements specify that the actor must be a cluster administrator or hold specific role-based access control (RBAC) permissions capable of modifying the Submariner Custom Resource. Network exposure is constrained by the cluster's API server accessibility, while payload behavior involves the execution of unauthorized code within the deployed container context. The post-exploitation impact includes full administrative control over cluster nodes, potential lateral movement across connected clusters, and complete compromise of the underlying Kubernetes orchestration plane."
}