Description

Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in Foton Core <= 1.1.1 versions.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-13T14:17:09.350Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-13T14:17:09.350Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An unauthenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been identified in Foton Core versions 1.1.1 and prior. This security flaw allows remote, unauthenticated threat actors to read arbitrary files from the underlying operating system running the web application. The presence of this vulnerability poses severe risk implications, potentially leading to the disclosure of sensitive configuration files, source code, credentials, and system internals depending on the privilege level of the web server process. The attack vector requires no prior authentication or specialized privileges, lowering the barrier to entry for malicious actors scanning for or targeting exposed web applications. Exploitation relies on the application insecurely handling user-supplied input intended for file retrieval or inclusion processes without proper sanitization, validation, or path traversal restriction. Remediation requires updating the affected software to a patched version or applying input filtering controls to neutralize directory traversal sequences within the vulnerable component.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability exists within Foton Core <= 1.1.1 due to insufficient input validation and sanitization of user-supplied parameters passed to file handling or inclusion routines. Specifically, the vulnerable component fails to properly neutralize directory traversal sequences such as dot-dot-slash patterns ('../') or absolute file paths. Because the flaw is accessible without authentication, any remote attacker can directly interact with the exposed endpoints over the network.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the adversary identifies the vulnerable parameter or endpoint within Foton Core responsible for processing file paths or resource loading. Second, the attacker crafts a malicious HTTP request containing payload strings consisting of traversal sequences combined with target system file paths, such as /etc/passwd on Linux-based deployments. Third, the unauthenticated HTTP request is sent directly to the server hosting the vulnerable application. Fourth, the application processes the tainted input without adequately restricting the file system scope, passing the concatenated path directly to underlying file system APIs. Finally, the server reads the targeted file and returns its contents within the HTTP response body, granting the attacker unauthorized visibility into restricted server-side resources.\nPost-exploitation impact includes the potential exposure of sensitive environment variables, database connection strings, application configuration files containing secret keys, and system user data. If the application runs with elevated privileges or if sensitive files possess permissive access control lists, the depth of compromise increases significantly. The root cause stems from a lack of secure coding practices regarding file system operations, specifically failing to enforce a strict whitelist of permissible files or utilizing robust path canonicalization functions to ensure requested resources resolve strictly within the designated web root or document directory."
}