Description

Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Power Automate allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-03T23:17:19.817Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-03T23:17:19.817Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified within the Power Automate architecture. This flaw enables an authorized attacker to manipulate server-side requests to interact with internal network resources, effectively bypassing perimeter security controls.\nThe vulnerability type is categorized as SSRF, which occurs when an application fetches a remote resource without sufficiently validating the user-supplied URL or destination. By leveraging this deficiency, an attacker can coerce the Power Automate service into performing requests on their behalf against internal services or restricted endpoints.\nThe primary impact of this vulnerability is unauthorized privilege escalation. By interacting with internal infrastructure that is otherwise inaccessible from the public internet, the attacker can exploit trust relationships, bypass authentication mechanisms, or gain access to sensitive administrative interfaces.\nThe vulnerability affects the Power Automate platform. Exploitation requires the attacker to possess an authorized account on the system, as the attack relies on the ability to trigger service-side requests through the product's functional features. The risk implication is significant, as it transitions a low-privileged or standard user account into a position where they can perform unauthorized actions against the broader internal network, potentially compromising backend services that rely on implicit trust from the Power Automate infrastructure.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper sanitization and validation of user-controlled inputs within the Power Automate request-handling logic. Specifically, the service fails to enforce strict allow-lists or network segmentation policies when initiating outbound HTTP or network requests to resources defined by the user.\nThe exploitation flow begins when an authenticated user submits a crafted payload containing a destination URL pointing to an internal target, such as a local network service, metadata service, or an internal API endpoint. When the Power Automate engine processes this request, it attempts to resolve and retrieve the specified resource. Because the backend service performs the request as the origin, it utilizes the service's higher-privileged context to access internal targets that are otherwise firewalled off from the external attacker.\nThe vulnerable component is the request processing module of Power Automate, which is responsible for fetching external content for workflow automation or connector functionality. This component lacks the necessary ingress/egress filtering, allowing it to act as an effective proxy for the attacker. The attack surface includes any connector or action within Power Automate that accepts a URL or host address parameter.\nBy manipulating the request, an attacker can achieve several post-exploitation objectives:\n1. Internal Port Scanning: The attacker can probe internal IP ranges to identify active services and listening ports within the corporate network.\n2. Internal Service Interaction: The attacker can interface with internal HTTP-based management consoles or REST APIs. If these internal services rely on network-level authentication or IP-based trust, the SSRF vulnerability effectively renders these security controls inert.\n3. Metadata Service Exfiltration: If the Power Automate service is hosted on cloud infrastructure, the attacker may attempt to query local metadata endpoints to extract environment secrets, IAM tokens, or configuration details.\n4. Privilege Escalation: By interacting with sensitive internal administrative APIs, the attacker can perform unauthorized actions, change account permissions, or pivot to compromise additional systems, thereby escalating their privileges beyond the scope of their original account access level.\nThe attack is performed without direct external access to the target; instead, the Power Automate infrastructure itself serves as the malicious relay, masking the attacker's origin and circumventing standard network security perimeters."
}