Description

Out-of-bounds read in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T17:18:57.937Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T17:18:57.937Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists within the Windows NTFS file system implementation, enabling an authenticated local attacker to execute unauthorized information disclosure against targeted systems.\nThe primary impact of this security flaw is the potential exposure of sensitive memory contents, which may include kernel-level data structures or residual user-mode artifacts residing in adjacent memory regions.\nThe affected product is Windows NTFS, impacting systems running the vulnerable file system driver where local file operations can be manipulated.\nThe risk implications involve the potential leakage of critical system memory state, which could be leveraged by an adversary to facilitate secondary exploitation phases, such as bypassing security mitigations like Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR).\nAttacker capabilities are restricted to local access, requiring the adversary to possess authorization to execute code or interact locally with the underlying file system structures.\nExploitation requirements dictate that the attacker must already possess local execution privileges on the target host, and the attack vector is confined to local privilege boundaries without remote network exposure.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from improper bounds checking within the Windows NTFS driver component when parsing specially crafted file system metadata or performing memory read operations.\nSpecifically, the vulnerable component fails to adequately validate input offsets or lengths prior to executing read operations against memory buffers, leading to out-of-bounds memory access conditions.\nAuthentication requirements dictate that the attacking entity must be locally authenticated to interact with the Windows environment and trigger the vulnerable NTFS driver routines.\nPrivilege requirements specify that the attacker must hold local access rights, though specific privilege escalations might not be strictly necessary if baseline interactive or programmatic access to the file system API is available.\nNetwork exposure is entirely absent, as the vulnerability is local and cannot be triggered remotely via network protocols or untrusted remote connections.\nThe step-by-step attack flow begins with the authenticated attacker preparing a malicious or malformed request, structure, or input intended for the NTFS file system driver.\nNext, the attacker invokes specific file system APIs or system calls that force the NTFS driver to parse the malformed data structures.\nDuring the parsing phase, the driver calculates memory offsets based on untrusted or improperly validated input parameters supplied within the file system metadata.\nBecause bounds verification is insufficient, the read operation extends past the allocated boundaries of the intended internal buffer into adjacent kernel or system memory regions.\nThe payload behavior involves capturing the unauthorized data read from the out-of-bounds memory location and returning it to the attacker-controlled context through standard output channels, error messages, or application responses.\nThe post-exploitation impact centers on unauthorized information disclosure, where the exposed memory contents can be analyzed to reveal memory layouts, encryption keys, or internal kernel pointers useful for constructing more complex multi-stage exploit chains."
}