Description

NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause improper certificate validation. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure, data tampering, and denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-22T15:17:12.417Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-22T15:17:12.417Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical security vulnerability exists within the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux involving improper certificate validation protocols. This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass established security mechanisms during the authentication or communication handshake process. By successfully exploiting this weakness, an adversary can perform man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, leading to significant security compromises.\nThe primary impact of this vulnerability encompasses unauthorized information disclosure, data tampering, and potential denial of service (DoS) conditions against the infrastructure controller. The vulnerability affects the integrity and confidentiality of communication channels used by the software. Exploitation does not necessarily require complex user interaction but depends on the attacker's ability to intercept or redirect network traffic directed toward the vulnerable component. Given the nature of the infrastructure controller, this vulnerability poses a severe risk to the secure operation of the host environment, potentially allowing adversaries to inject malicious payloads or exfiltrate sensitive configuration and operational data. Organizations should prioritize assessing network exposure and implementing immediate defensive measures.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from a failure in the NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux to correctly verify the validity and authenticity of TLS/SSL certificates during network communications. Specifically, the implementation of the certificate verification logic does not adequately enforce chain-of-trust validation, expiration checking, or hostname verification protocols. This deficiency allows an attacker to present a forged or self-signed certificate that the controller incorrectly accepts as trusted.\nThe attack flow typically follows a man-in-the-middle (MitM) pattern. An attacker positioned between the controller and a legitimate communication peer can intercept the encrypted traffic stream. Because the controller fails to perform robust certificate validation, it establishes a secure session with the attacker's machine instead of the intended endpoint. Once the connection is established, the attacker assumes a privileged position to decrypt, inspect, and modify the data in transit. This allows for the injection of malicious commands, modification of management traffic, or the redirection of data packets to unauthorized sinks.\nThe root cause is identified as an insufficiently hardened cryptographic implementation where the certificate verification callback or library configuration is either bypassed or improperly implemented to allow connections regardless of the server's certificate status. This lack of rigorous validation undermines the entire PKI infrastructure expected in enterprise-grade software.\nPost-exploitation impact is multifaceted: 1) Information Disclosure: The attacker can gain access to sensitive credentials, configuration files, or administrative commands transmitted over the connection. 2) Data Tampering: By altering communications, the attacker can manipulate controller logic, potentially causing system instability or unauthorized configuration changes. 3) Denial of Service: By providing malicious responses during the handshake or session, the attacker can cause the controller service to crash or become unresponsive, effectively severing management capabilities. The vulnerability is network-accessible and generally does not require prior authentication, making the controller highly susceptible to remote exploitation if network segments are not strictly isolated."
}