Description

NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a vulnerability in its command-line interface, where an attacker could cause OS command injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-25T21:17:29.817Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-25T21:17:29.817Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux utility contains a critical vulnerability stemming from improper input validation within its command-line interface. This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to perform OS command injection by supplying maliciously crafted input that is subsequently executed by the underlying host operating system.\nThe impact of this vulnerability is severe, potentially facilitating remote code execution (RCE) with the privileges of the NemoClaw process. Successful exploitation enables unauthorized parties to manipulate system data, gain access to sensitive information, trigger denial of service (DoS) conditions, or escalate privileges within the host environment.\nThis vulnerability poses a significant risk to organizational security, as it bypasses standard command-line interaction boundaries. Attackers capable of interacting with the NemoClaw interface can weaponize this flaw to gain persistent system access or exfiltrate proprietary data processed by the application.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is the insecure handling of user-supplied arguments by the NVIDIA NemoClaw command-line interface. The application fails to properly sanitize or neutralize shell metacharacters before passing input strings to internal system calls or shell execution functions.\nExploitation occurs when an attacker provides input containing command injection sequences—such as semicolons, pipe characters, or backticks—to the NemoClaw CLI arguments. Because the interface fails to enforce strict input validation or use parameterized execution models, the operating system's command processor interprets the injected payload as valid instructions appended to the legitimate command.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker identifies a NemoClaw command argument that interfaces with system shell operations. Second, the attacker crafts a malicious input string designed to terminate the intended command and execute a secondary, unauthorized binary or script. Third, upon execution, the NemoClaw process invokes the system shell with the attacker-provided payload, resulting in the execution of arbitrary commands with the effective permissions of the NemoClaw process.\nThis vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it facilitates post-exploitation activities including, but not limited to, unauthorized file system modification, the installation of backdoors, and the compromise of system-level credentials. Since the vulnerability exists within the command-line interface, it may be exposed locally to any user with access to the binary or potentially remotely if the interface is integrated into network-accessible services or automated workflows.\nThe lack of adequate escaping mechanisms at the application layer means that any shell-interpreted characters are processed blindly. Consequently, the application effectively functions as an execution proxy for an attacker. Given the nature of command injection, defensive measures must focus on the complete decoupling of user input from shell execution contexts."
}