Description

NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a vulnerability in its remote-access helper workflow, where an attacker could cause weak authentication. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, information disclosure, and data tampering.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-25T21:17:29.687Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-25T21:17:29.687Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The vulnerability identified in NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux resides within the remote-access helper workflow, where a flaw in authentication implementation allows for unauthorized access.\nThis vulnerability is characterized as an authentication bypass or weak authentication mechanism, potentially enabling remote attackers to circumvent established security controls.\nSuccessful exploitation of this flaw grants an attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the service, perform unauthorized information disclosure, and engage in data tampering activities.\nThe vulnerability affects the Linux version of NVIDIA NemoClaw and poses a significant risk to system integrity and confidentiality.\nAn attacker can exploit this weakness remotely without the necessity of valid user credentials, provided they can interact with the vulnerable remote-access helper component.\nThe risk profile is critical due to the potential for full system compromise, allowing an adversary to pivot within the host environment or manipulate sensitive data streams processed by the application.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the implementation of the authentication logic within the NVIDIA NemoClaw remote-access helper workflow. This component acts as an intermediary for remote connectivity, but fails to properly validate or enforce security tokens during the handshake process.\nExploitation occurs when an attacker sends specially crafted requests to the vulnerable helper service. Because the service does not verify the authenticity of the session initiation, the attacker can successfully establish a connection by bypassing the authentication sequence entirely or by providing trivially reproducible or predictable authentication artifacts.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the attacker identifies the network port associated with the NemoClaw remote-access helper. Second, the attacker initiates a communication stream that deliberately omits or malforms the authentication header expected by the backend service. Third, the vulnerability in the workflow logic results in the service defaulting to an authenticated state, thereby granting the remote party access to privileged functions.\nOnce the session is established, the attacker gains the ability to leverage the helper's legitimate administrative or functional API calls. Since the remote-access helper often operates with elevated system permissions to facilitate remote management, this permits the execution of arbitrary commands on the host operating system.\nInformation disclosure occurs as the attacker can query the service for configuration files, process memory, or auxiliary data handled by the NemoClaw application. Furthermore, the ability to tamper with data arises from the attacker's capacity to modify input streams processed by the service, potentially corrupting internal application state or altering output sent to other system components.\nThe vulnerability does not require prior local access to the target system; it is exposed via the network stack, making it an attractive target for remote adversaries. Post-exploitation impact includes the potential for persistent backdooring, lateral movement within the Linux environment, and the total loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the services managed by NemoClaw."
}