Description

NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a vulnerability in the Telegram bridge component, where an attacker could cause an OS command injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-25T21:17:29.433Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-25T21:17:29.433Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical OS command injection vulnerability has been identified within the Telegram bridge component of NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux.\nThe vulnerability arises due to insufficient sanitization of input data processed by the bridge, allowing an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary OS commands.\nSuccessful exploitation of this flaw can result in full system compromise, including unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, unauthorized information disclosure, and illicit data tampering.\nThe vulnerability impacts NVIDIA NemoClaw deployments on Linux environments. Given the nature of command injection, the risk is classified as critical, as it bypasses standard application-layer security controls.\nAttackers do not necessarily require prior system access if the Telegram bridge interface is reachable, though the specific requirements depend on the bridge's implementation and exposed endpoints.\nOrganizations utilizing NVIDIA NemoClaw are at high risk, as this vulnerability provides a direct pathway for threat actors to achieve persistence and lateral movement within the underlying host operating system.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the Telegram bridge component of NVIDIA NemoClaw. The root cause is the insecure handling of user-supplied or external data that is subsequently passed to system-level functions or shell environments without proper validation or parameterization.\nIn the context of the Telegram bridge, the application likely parses incoming messages, events, or configuration parameters associated with the bridge protocol. If these inputs are passed directly into an execution sink, such as system(), popen(), or equivalent wrappers without rigorous sanitization, an attacker can append shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, |, or backticks) to manipulate the intended command execution flow.\nThe attack flow initiates when an attacker crafts a malicious payload encapsulated within a Telegram interaction or bridge-related request. When the NemoClaw component processes this input, the vulnerable code fails to distinguish between legitimate command arguments and malicious shell commands. The shell interpreter subsequently parses the tainted input, executing the attacker-supplied commands with the privileges assigned to the NemoClaw process.\nExploitation allows for the execution of arbitrary commands, which typically inherit the security context of the NemoClaw service. If the service is running with elevated privileges (e.g., as root or a high-privilege service account), the attacker achieves immediate privilege escalation. Post-exploitation activities may include the deployment of web shells, the installation of backdoors, exfiltration of sensitive configuration files, or tampering with data integrity to hide malicious activity.\nBecause the vulnerability occurs at the intersection of external input handling and OS-level process invocation, the attack surface is dictated by how the Telegram bridge exposes its input interfaces. Even if the application logic itself is robust, the underlying reliance on shell-based process execution introduces this vector. There is no requirement for complex memory corruption techniques, as the flaw is a logical failure in input sanitization, making the exploit highly reliable across various Linux distributions where NemoClaw is installed."
}