Description

NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a vulnerability in its NIM management component, where an attacker could cause OS command injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-25T21:17:28.927Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-25T21:17:28.927Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical OS command injection vulnerability exists within the NIM management component of NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated or authenticated attacker, depending on component access, to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying host operating system.\nThe vulnerability arises from improper input sanitization within the management component, which fails to neutralize malicious shell metacharacters provided by an attacker. Successful exploitation grants the adversary the ability to execute unauthorized code with the privileges of the service, leading to full system compromise.\nThe potential impact includes data tampering, unauthorized information disclosure, and service-level denial of service. Because the flaw exists within the NIM management interface, it poses significant risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the host system. Remediation is necessary to prevent remote code execution (RCE) scenarios where an attacker could gain persistent access to the server environment.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the NIM management component of NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux, specifically within the logic responsible for processing configuration parameters or management requests that interface with system-level binaries or shell environments.\nThe root cause is an improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (CWE-78), commonly occurring when user-supplied input is passed directly to system execution APIs (such as exec, system, or popen) without sufficient validation or parameterization.\nThe attack flow begins when an attacker identifies an endpoint or management interface that triggers internal system calls within the NIM management component. By injecting shell metacharacters—such as semicolons (;), backticks (`), or pipe symbols (|)—the attacker can escape the intended command string and append arbitrary shell commands.\nUpon receiving a crafted request, the NIM management service fails to sanitize the input, concatenating the malicious payload into the executed process stream. The operating system shell then interprets the payload as a secondary command, executing it with the effective privileges of the NemoClaw service account.\nPost-exploitation activities are limited only by the permissions of the service process. If the NIM management component is running with elevated or root privileges, the attacker can achieve full system takeover. This includes the ability to exfiltrate sensitive configuration files, modify internal data stores, or terminate critical processes to facilitate a denial of service.\nThe technical failure demonstrates a lack of robust input validation and the absence of parameterized command execution. By failing to whitelist inputs or use safer library alternatives that prevent shell expansion, the component effectively acts as a vector for remote command execution. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous in networked environments where the NIM management component is exposed to external interfaces, as it may bypass traditional authentication barriers depending on the configuration of the service."
}