Description

NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a vulnerability in its status and logs plugin commands, where an attacker could cause OS command injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-25T21:17:28.803Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-25T21:17:28.803Z",
  "executiveSummary": "NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux is susceptible to an OS command injection vulnerability residing within the status and logs plugin command interfaces. This flaw permits an unauthenticated or authenticated attacker, depending on deployment context, to manipulate input parameters passed to system-level commands, leading to arbitrary code execution on the host operating system.\nThe vulnerability manifests due to improper input validation or sanitization when the application processes user-supplied data before executing underlying shell commands. Successful exploitation grants an attacker the ability to execute unauthorized instructions with the privileges of the NemoClaw service process. This leads to critical security implications, including unauthorized data tampering, sensitive information disclosure from system logs or environmental variables, and potential denial of service through intentional system crashes or resource exhaustion. The exploit requires the attacker to have access to the affected command interface, making the risk profile highly dependent on network exposure and service accessibility.",
  "technicalDetails": "The core of this vulnerability is an OS command injection flaw within the NemoClaw plugin framework. Specifically, the status and logs plugin subcommands fail to adequately sanitize arguments before incorporating them into shell execution strings. In Linux-based environments, if an application passes unsanitized user input directly to functions such as system(), popen(), or exec(), an attacker can inject shell metacharacters—such as semicolons (;), backticks (`), or pipes (|)—to terminate the intended command and execute arbitrary secondary commands.\nThe attack flow begins with the delivery of a crafted payload via the interface responsible for invoking status or logs commands. When the NemoClaw binary processes this input, the vulnerable routine fails to enforce a strict whitelist of permitted characters or utilize parameterized execution APIs that safely separate data from executable code. Consequently, the command interpreter (e.g., /bin/sh or /bin/bash) parses the injected metacharacters as delimiters, allowing the payload to execute context-switched commands.\nFor example, if the plugin expects a log identifier but receives an input string appended with '; rm -rf /', the underlying shell executes the intended log retrieval followed by the destructive command. Because these commands are typically executed within the operational context of the NemoClaw service, the attacker inherits the service's system privileges. If the service is running with root or elevated administrative rights, the impact is catastrophic, granting the attacker total control over the host system.\nThis vulnerability is particularly dangerous because the exploitation method is inherently simple, requiring only the ability to interact with the plugin command interface. Once injection is successful, the attacker can install persistent backdoors, exfiltrate private data, or manipulate the system state to deny service to legitimate users. The lack of robust input boundary validation within the status and logs plugins represents a systemic failure in the plugin architectural security model, enabling post-exploitation activities including lateral movement within the network or privilege escalation if the initial service account is restricted. The technical risk is exacerbated by the lack of defensive measures like chroot jails, seccomp filters, or strict capability dropping that might otherwise contain an attacker's execution scope."
}