Description

NVIDIA OpenShell for Linux contains a vulnerability in its sandbox provisioning API, where an attacker could cause an incomplete list of disallowed inputs. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, data tampering, and denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "9.9",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-25T21:17:28.050Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-25T21:17:28.050Z",
  "executiveSummary": "NVIDIA OpenShell for Linux contains a security vulnerability within its sandbox provisioning API architecture.\nThe vulnerability manifests as an incomplete input validation mechanism, specifically regarding the filtering of disallowed inputs provided to the sandbox environment.\nThis flaw allows a malicious actor to circumvent existing security boundaries, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and severe system compromise.\nThe scope of impact includes unauthorized information disclosure, data tampering, and denial of service (DoS) conditions.\nThe vulnerability resides in the sandbox provisioning interface, which serves as the trust boundary for external input processing.\nSuccessful exploitation permits an attacker to perform operations outside the intended sandbox constraints, effectively breaking the isolation between the untrusted input source and the host environment.\nThis presents a high-risk scenario for environments leveraging NVIDIA OpenShell, as the compromised sandbox provisioning API acts as a gateway to broader system exploitation.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability originates from a deficiency in the input sanitization logic implemented within the NVIDIA OpenShell sandbox provisioning API.\nThe root cause is an incomplete blacklist or validation routine that fails to properly identify and block malicious payloads intended for the sandbox environment.\nIn a standard sandbox architecture, the provisioning API is responsible for strictly defining the environment constraints, allowed system calls, and permitted file system interactions. Because the current implementation fails to exhaustively filter disallowed inputs, the sandbox runtime does not enforce the security policy as intended.\nThe attack flow begins when an attacker interacts with the sandbox provisioning API, submitting a specifically crafted request that bypasses the incomplete filter. By utilizing input vectors that fall within the 'blind spot' of the validation logic, the attacker can supply parameters or commands that are subsequently interpreted or executed by the host process with elevated or non-restricted context.\nOnce the initial filter is bypassed, the attacker can leverage the sandbox's underlying execution environment to perform unauthorized operations. Depending on the depth of the bypass, this may result in path traversal, arbitrary command execution, or the loading of malicious libraries that were intended to be restricted.\nPost-exploitation, the attacker may pivot from the sandbox context to the host OS. Given the systemic nature of the provisioning API, this could lead to a full container breakout or privilege escalation if the API process runs with higher privileges than the sandbox itself.\nThe lack of robust input validation means that even standard administrative workflows can be coerced into performing harmful actions if an attacker influences the provisioning parameters.\nExploitation requires the attacker to have access to the interface that consumes the vulnerable API. The impact extends to the integrity and confidentiality of the host system, as an attacker can manipulate system-level configurations or exfiltrate sensitive data typically isolated within the sandbox.\nThe vulnerability is primarily characterized as an input validation failure resulting in a loss of process isolation."
}