Description

NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a vulnerability in its migration command, where a local attacker could cause code injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-25T21:17:27.923Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-25T21:17:27.923Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A critical security vulnerability exists within the migration command functionality of NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux, enabling local code injection.\nThe vulnerability permits an unprivileged local attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the application process.\nSuccessful exploitation can result in full system compromise, encompassing data tampering, unauthorized information disclosure, and a persistent denial of service (DoS) state.\nThe flaw stems from insufficient input sanitization during the migration execution process, allowing for the injection and execution of malicious payloads.\nThis issue poses a significant risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the host environment, as it facilitates unauthorized control over the NemoClaw runtime.\nExploitation requires local access to the system where the application is deployed, specifically targeting the migration command interface.\nImmediate remediation is necessary to prevent local users from escalating privileges or compromising sensitive data residing within the application's context.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the NemoClaw migration utility, which fails to properly validate or sanitize user-supplied input before passing it to underlying system interfaces. In the context of the migration command, the application inadvertently processes unsanitized input as executable instructions or shell commands, creating a direct vector for command injection.\nWhen a local attacker invokes the vulnerable migration command, they can append malicious arguments or crafted input streams that manipulate the execution flow of the application. Because the migration process typically operates with elevated system or service-level privileges, the injected code inherits these execution rights, effectively bypassing the security boundary intended to constrain local users.\nThe attack flow begins with the local actor identifying the vulnerable entry point within the migration command. By supplying a specially crafted payload—designed to escape the intended syntax of the migration utility—the attacker forces the underlying shell or interpreter to execute secondary commands. This could manifest as command concatenation, path traversal, or script injection, depending on how the application handles input-to-execution mapping.\nUpon successful payload injection, the application executes the malicious instructions within the runtime environment. The impact is immediate and severe, allowing the attacker to perform arbitrary read/write operations on the filesystem, modify application configurations to facilitate persistence, or exfiltrate sensitive data stored in cleartext within the environment. Furthermore, an attacker may terminate critical processes or corrupt migration logs, leading to a state of denial of service that prevents legitimate administrative updates.\nBecause this vulnerability involves the direct execution of arbitrary code within the application context, the post-exploitation impact is extensive. An attacker can leverage the compromised process to pivot deeper into the host operating system, potentially leading to privilege escalation if the application is run with sufficient administrative or root-level permissions. The technical core of this issue highlights a lack of effective sandboxing and input boundary enforcement, which are critical for the secure operation of command-line migration utilities."
}