Description

NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux contains a vulnerability in its installation process, where an attacker could cause execution of untrusted code. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, information disclosure, and denial of service.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "8.1",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-25T21:17:27.793Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-25T21:17:27.793Z",
  "executiveSummary": "NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux is susceptible to a vulnerability within its installation process that permits the execution of untrusted code.\nThe vulnerability type pertains to insecure installation procedures, likely involving improper handling of file permissions, library paths, or execution environments during the setup phase.\nSuccessful exploitation allows a local or remote attacker, depending on the vector, to achieve arbitrary code execution on the host system.\nThe impact includes full system compromise, escalation of privileges from the installer's context to higher levels, sensitive data tampering, unauthorized information disclosure, and potential denial of service.\nThe risk is severe, as the installation process often operates with elevated privileges, meaning the compromise may occur within a privileged security context.\nAttackers require the ability to interact with the installation process, possibly by manipulating environment variables, injecting malicious payloads into installation directories, or intercepting insecure setup routines.\nOrganizations deploying NVIDIA NemoClaw are at risk of complete node compromise if the installation procedure is not performed in a hardened, controlled environment.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability in NVIDIA NemoClaw for Linux resides in the installation script or binary packaging logic, which fails to securely validate inputs, paths, or execution parameters during deployment.\nThe vulnerability allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary code by manipulating the state or files accessed during the installation sequence. This is typically symptomatic of insecure handling of temporary directories, predictable file locations, or improper sanitization of external commands executed with elevated privileges during the setup phase.\nThe attack flow initiates when the installer is invoked, often requiring root or administrative privileges for system-wide configuration. An attacker may leverage race conditions (TOCTOU - Time of Check, Time of Use) if the installer performs operations in insecurely permissioned temporary directories such as /tmp. By replacing legitimate installation components or scripts with malicious alternatives before the installer executes them, the attacker ensures their payload runs with the security context of the installer process.\nAlternatively, if the installation process relies on dynamically linked libraries (DLL hijacking) or utilizes insecure system calls to environment-dependent binaries, an attacker could manipulate the environment (e.g., LD_PRELOAD or PATH variables) to redirect the execution flow toward unauthorized, malicious binary code.\nOnce the payload is executed, the attacker gains the ability to perform operations equivalent to the privileges of the installer process. If the installation runs as root, the attacker effectively achieves full system control. Post-exploitation activities include the deployment of persistent backdoors, data exfiltration from the host, tampering with local configuration files to weaken system posture, or the initiation of a denial-of-service condition by crashing system processes.\nThe vulnerability manifests within the core installation management component of NVIDIA NemoClaw. The exploitation does not necessarily require authenticated access to the application itself, as the attack surface exists during the initial deployment or system update phases. The level of impact is contingent upon the privilege level of the user initiating the installation and the environment in which the package is deployed."
}