Description

The hunt_delete() VQL function allows deleting hunts.  Velociraptor misapplied the permission check requiring only COLLECT_CLIENT (usually assigned to the "investigator" role) instead of the "DELETE_RESULTS" permission (usually only assigned to "administrators").

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "6.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-12T10:17:20.193Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-12T10:17:20.193Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An insufficient permission enforcement vulnerability exists in Velociraptor regarding the deletion of hunts via the hunt_delete() VQL function. The root cause stems from the application enforcing an incorrect and insufficiently restrictive privilege check during the execution of the function. Specifically, the system validates against the COLLECT_CLIENT permission, typically assigned to the lower-privileged investigator role, rather than mandating the DELETE_RESULTS permission, which is restricted to administrators.\nThe business impact of this vulnerability involves unauthorized deletion of forensic data and disruption of ongoing incident response or threat hunting operations. Any authenticated user holding the investigator role and possessing COLLECT_CLIENT privileges can execute the hunt_delete() VQL function to remove hunts from the system, bypassing intended role-based access control boundaries. The attack requires authenticated access to the Velociraptor platform with low-level investigator privileges. No complex exploit chains or specialized attack vectors are required, as the flaw lies entirely within the server-side authorization logic governing the VQL query execution context.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the authorization logic governing the execution of the hunt_delete() VQL function in Velociraptor. VQL (Velociraptor Query Language) functions execute server-side operations based on parameters passed through administrative queries or API interactions. Access control to these functions is enforced via capability checks mapped to specific role-based permissions.\nDuring the processing of the hunt_delete() VQL function, the underlying access control enforcement mechanism evaluates the requesting user's session against an incorrect privilege requirement. Instead of verifying that the executing security context includes the DELETE_RESULTS permission, which is designated exclusively for administrative roles, the function incorrectly checks for the presence of the COLLECT_CLIENT permission. The COLLECT_CLIENT permission is a standard capability typically assigned to users holding the investigator role to allow scoping and launching artifact collections on endpoints.\nThe step-by-step attack flow proceeds as follows: First, an attacker authenticates to the Velociraptor platform using credentials associated with an investigator role, which grants the COLLECT_CLIENT permission. Second, the attacker formulates a VQL query invoking the hunt_delete() function, targeting specific hunt identifiers that they wish to remove. Third, the attacker submits the VQL query to the server via the user interface, API, or automated tooling. Fourth, the server intercepts the hunt_delete() invocation and queries the access control subsystem for authorization. Fifth, the subsystem evaluates the session against the misconfigured COLLECT_CLIENT permission requirement. Sixth, because the investigator role possesses this permission, the authorization check returns a success status, bypassing the intended administrator-only restriction. Finally, the hunt_delete() function executes successfully, resulting in the permanent deletion of the specified hunt and associated metadata from the system.\nThe vulnerable component is the permission validation routine associated with the hunt_delete() VQL function handler within the Velociraptor server codebase. The required privilege level is effectively reduced from administrative-only to investigator-level access. Authentication is required to exploit this flaw, but no elevated administrative privileges are necessary. The post-exploitation impact includes denial of service against active hunting operations, loss of forensic integrity, and unauthorized destruction of audit trails or investigative artifacts stored within hunts."
}