Description

The Mira cloud API accepts the firmware version reported by the companion app as authoritative for a given device, without independently attesting the version from the device itself. An authenticated attacker could submit arbitrary firmware version strings for their own device, allowing them to evade vendor-side vulnerable-fleet analytics, suppress security update prompts to the user, and misrepresent patch-adoption metrics.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "4.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T22:18:41.897Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T22:18:41.897Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The Mira cloud API suffers from a lack of proper device attestation regarding firmware version reporting, allowing authenticated users to spoof version data submitted by the companion app. This vulnerability enables attackers to bypass vendor-side vulnerable-fleet analytics, suppress security update prompts for users, and falsify patch-adoption metrics. The affected product is the Mira cloud API and its device-companion app ecosystem. The risk implications include compromised fleet visibility, distorted telemetry, and delayed patching behaviors driven by suppressed user notifications. Exploitation requires an authenticated attacker capable of interacting with the cloud API and submitting arbitrary firmware version strings for their own device. No specific firmware version numbers or file paths are provided in the input, but the architectural flaw lies entirely in trusting client-supplied metadata without cryptographic verification from the hardware endpoint.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from inadequate trust boundaries and a failure to implement cryptographic device attestation within the Mira cloud API. Instead of challenging the hardware device directly or verifying cryptographically signed telemetry originating from the physical device, the cloud API unconditionally accepts the firmware version string reported by the companion app as authoritative. The vulnerable component is the cloud API ingestion endpoint responsible for processing device telemetry and status updates. Exploitation requires an authenticated attacker who has access to an account and a legitimate or emulated companion app interface. The attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the authenticated attacker intercepts or crafts an HTTP request destined for the Mira cloud API reporting the device status. Second, the attacker modifies the parameter containing the firmware version string to an arbitrary value, such as a falsely advanced or patched version number. Third, the Mira cloud API receives this unverified payload and updates the backend database to reflect the fraudulent firmware version for the targeted device identifier. Because the backend relies on this self-reported data for fleet-wide analytics and user notification logic, the consequences include the evasion of vendor-side vulnerable-fleet analytics, the complete suppression of security update prompts presented to the user interface, and the misrepresentation of overall patch-adoption metrics. The network exposure involves the cloud API endpoint accessible to authenticated users via the companion app architecture. Post-exploitation impact remains confined to telemetry tampering, fleet visibility evasion, and denial of security awareness, rather than direct remote code execution on the underlying cloud infrastructure or physical hardware."
}