Description

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last underscore in certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens. As a result, part of an affected token could appear in terminal or CI output that is captured or shared. Authenticated users are affected if they ran gh auth status (without the --show-token flag) with a token type whose format contains an underscore after the prefix. This includes fine-grained personal access tokens (github_pat_*) and GitHub App installation and user access tokens (ghs_*, ghu_*; for example, ghs_<APPID>_<JWT>), as well as the Actions GITHUB_TOKEN. Classic tokens such as gho_* and ghp_* have an underscore-free body and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "3.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-06T22:18:13.087Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-06T22:18:13.087Z",
  "executiveSummary": "An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the GitHub CLI (gh) tool prior to version 2.97.0, specifically within the gh auth status command functionality.\nThe flaw causes the application to improperly mask certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens, leaving portions of the sensitive credential exposed after the last underscore character.\nWhen authenticated users execute the affected command, partial token values can be leaked into terminal outputs, log files, or continuous integration (CI) environments where output is captured, persisted, or shared.\nThis exposes systems and repositories to unauthorized access if third parties or malicious actors gain access to the captured log artifacts containing the leaked token fragments.\nThe vulnerability affects systems utilizing GitHub CLI prior to version 2.97.0 and requires an authenticated user to execute the vulnerable command with specific token types containing underscores.\nThe risk implication is unauthorized resource access across repositories and infrastructure tied to the compromised credentials.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability lies in string manipulation logic within the gh auth status command of the GitHub CLI (gh) tool.\nPrior to version 2.97.0, the masking mechanism implemented for token redaction incorrectly assumed a token structure where sensitive data could be safely masked by only redacting characters following the final underscore.\nThe vulnerable components include token types whose formatting contains an underscore after the distinct prefix, specifically fine-grained personal access tokens matching the pattern github_pat_*, GitHub App installation and user access tokens matching ghs_* and ghu_* (such as ghs_<APPID>_<JWT>), as well as the runtime Actions GITHUB_TOKEN.\nClassic tokens such as gho_* and ghp_* possess an underscore-free body and are therefore not susceptible to this specific improper masking behavior.\nExploitation occurs when an authenticated user runs the gh auth status command without supplying the --show-token flag, relying on the default output behavior.\nInstead of entirely redacting the sensitive credential, the output logic partially reveals the token string in standard output (stdout) or standard error (stderr).\nAttackers or unauthorized entities can exploit this vulnerability by harvesting terminal logs, job execution traces, or CI/CD pipeline build outputs that captured the execution of the vulnerable CLI command.\nOnce the partial or complete token is obtained from the logs, adversaries can leverage the extracted privileges to interact with GitHub APIs, access private repositories, or perform actions permitted by the scope of the leaked token.\nThe vulnerability requires local or CI/CD execution context where output logs are exposed, but does not require network-based exploitation primitives or advanced privilege escalation on the host running the CLI tool."
}