Description

There is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in DASYLab due to improper validation of user-supplied data.   This results in a read a past the end of an allocated heap buffer during string conversion.  Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a user to open a specially crafted .DSB file.  This issue affects all versions before 2026.0.0.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-03T22:18:10.463Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-03T22:18:10.463Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability is an out-of-bounds (OOB) read condition identified in DASYLab, affecting all versions prior to 2026.0.0. The flaw stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied data during the processing of .DSB files, specifically occurring during internal string conversion routines. The primary impact involves the potential exposure of sensitive heap memory, which may lead to information disclosure or application instability.\nExploitation is predicated on social engineering, requiring an attacker to induce a user to open a specially crafted, malicious .DSB file. Because the vulnerability is triggered upon the parsing of file contents, there is no requirement for prior authentication or elevated privileges beyond those of the victimized user. The risk is primarily associated with memory content leakage, which could potentially be leveraged by an attacker to bypass security mechanisms such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) or to exfiltrate sensitive data residing in the heap. The lack of robust input sanitization allows the application to reference memory offsets outside the boundaries of an allocated buffer, leading to an OOB read event.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is a failure in the application's bounds-checking logic during string processing within the .DSB file format parsing engine. When DASYLab encounters a maliciously structured .DSB file, the parser processes specific data segments that trigger a string conversion operation. During this operation, the application fails to adequately validate the length or format of the input data relative to the destination heap-allocated buffer. This oversight allows the application to perform read operations beyond the allocated memory segment.\nThe attack flow initiates when a victim opens a crafted .DSB file within DASYLab. The application identifies the malicious data structure and passes it to the vulnerable string conversion routine. Because the input string exceeds the expected buffer size, the internal pointer is advanced beyond the legitimate heap allocation. The read operation then accesses subsequent memory addresses, capturing whatever data is resident in adjacent heap blocks. This unauthorized memory access persists until the routine completes or the application encounters an unmapped memory page, the latter of which typically results in an application crash (Denial of Service).\nFrom a technical perspective, the vulnerability resides in the interaction between the file parser and the heap management sub-system. By controlling the contents of the .DSB file, an attacker can influence the state of the heap to some degree before the OOB read occurs. If the attacker can reliably place specific data structures in adjacent heap segments, they can use the OOB read to exfiltrate that data back to the user interface, error logs, or other observable application feedback mechanisms. This primitive is often a prerequisite for more complex exploit chains that require memory layout knowledge.\nAffected systems are restricted to all versions of DASYLab before 2026.0.0. There are no authentication requirements for this attack; the trigger is purely file-based. Exposure is local to the system where the DASYLab software is installed and used to open the malicious file. Post-exploitation impact is primarily limited to information disclosure, although the instability caused by the OOB access may facilitate a local denial-of-service condition through segmentation faults."
}