Description

There is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in DASYLab due to improper validation of user-supplied data.   This results in a read a few bytes past the end of an allocated heap buffer during file handling.  Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a user to open a specially crafted .DSB file.  This issue affects all versions before 2026.0.0.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-03T22:18:10.207Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-03T22:18:10.207Z",
  "executiveSummary": "DASYLab contains an out-of-bounds (OOB) read vulnerability arising from insufficient validation of user-supplied data during the parsing of .DSB files. This vulnerability resides in the application's file handling routines, where improper boundary checks allow the software to read memory beyond the intended allocation limits of a heap buffer.\nThe vulnerability affects all versions of DASYLab prior to 2026.0.0. Exploitation requires user interaction, specifically necessitating that an attacker successfully entices a victim to open a maliciously crafted .DSB file. Successful exploitation could potentially lead to the disclosure of sensitive information residing in heap memory adjacent to the vulnerable buffer, which may include pointers, credentials, or other system data. While the vulnerability is restricted to a read operation, the risk is significant due to potential information leakage that could facilitate further exploitation of the host system. The vulnerability does not require prior authentication, but it is contingent upon the target opening a specially prepared file.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of this vulnerability is a failure in the input validation logic within the DASYLab file-processing engine. When the application interprets a .DSB file, it allocates a heap buffer to hold data parsed from the file structure. Due to inadequate bounds checking during the read or copy operation, the software continues to read data beyond the allocated heap object's trailing edge.\nThe attack flow initiates when a threat actor creates a malformed .DSB file containing metadata or data fields that intentionally trigger an offset error during the file parsing phase. Upon the victim opening the malicious .DSB file within DASYLab, the application invokes its file-parsing component. As this component processes the crafted input, it lacks the necessary logic to verify that the length of the data being read corresponds correctly with the size of the allocated heap destination buffer. Consequently, the memory access pointer moves into adjacent heap regions, reading several bytes of arbitrary memory content.\nFrom an exploitation perspective, this out-of-bounds read can be leveraged to leak sensitive information from the process heap. By manipulating the contents of the heap preceding or following the target buffer—often achieved by 'heap grooming' or 'heap spraying' through other file operations—an attacker might be able to read specific memory segments that contain pointers, memory addresses, or sensitive application state data. This leaked information can then be utilized to circumvent security mitigations like Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), providing a foundation for more complex memory corruption attacks, such as code execution or privilege escalation.\nThe vulnerability affects all DASYLab versions prior to 2026.0.0. Exploitation is constrained by the need for user-assisted file execution, meaning the attack vector is localized to the victim's workstation upon the triggering event. The process operates under the current user's privileges, implying that any memory exposed by the OOB read is restricted to the memory space of the DASYLab application process. The lack of proper length validation in the file-handling function is the primary component failure, demonstrating a classic breakdown in secure memory management protocols during binary file parsing."
}