Description

Unleash is an open-source feature management platform. Prior to 7.5.2, 7.6.5, and 8.0.2, the addon and integration subsystem passes the operator-controlled parameters.url value from src/lib/addons/webhook.ts and the Slack, Microsoft Teams, Datadog, and New Relic integrations to Addon.fetchRetry in src/lib/addons/addon.ts without restricting loopback, link-local, private, or cloud metadata addresses. An authenticated actor with the root CREATE_ADDON or UPDATE_ADDON permission can cause the server to send requests from inside its network boundary, use integration event status as a blind probing oracle, forward Authorization, customHeaders, or DD-API-KEY values to an attacker-observed host, and deliver the feature-event JSON body to internal services. This issue is fixed in versions 7.5.2, 7.6.5, and 8.0.2.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.5",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-21T19:17:30.550Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-21T19:17:30.550Z",
  "executiveSummary": "Unleash prior to versions 7.5.2, 7.6.5, and 8.0.2 is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within its addon and integration subsystem.\nThe vulnerability allows an authenticated actor with specific administrative privileges to cause the Unleash server to dispatch HTTP requests to arbitrary locations, including loopback, link-local, private, and cloud metadata addresses.\nImpact includes leveraging integration event status as a blind probing oracle, exfiltrating sensitive authentication material such as Authorization headers, customHeaders, and DD-API-KEY values to an attacker-controlled host, and delivering feature-event JSON payloads to internal network services.\nExploitation requires authenticated access with root CREATE_ADDON or UPDATE_ADDON permissions.\nRisk implications include internal network reconnaissance, unauthorized interaction with internal microservices, and credential theft.\nThe issue is resolved in versions 7.5.2, 7.6.5, and 8.0.2.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation and lack of network boundary restrictions on operator-controlled parameters within the addon and integration subsystem of Unleash.\nSpecifically, the parameters.url value originating from src/lib/addons/webhook.ts, alongside integrations for Slack, Microsoft Teams, Datadog, and New Relic, is passed directly to the Addon.fetchRetry function located in src/lib/addons/addon.ts.\nThe application fails to restrict requests to loopback addresses, link-local addresses, private network spaces, or cloud provider metadata endpoints.\nAn attacker must possess authentication credentials and the root CREATE_ADDON or UPDATE_ADDON permissions to interact with the vulnerable subsystem.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: First, the authenticated attacker creates or updates a malicious webhook or integration configuration specifying a target URL pointing to an internal service, private IP address, or cloud metadata endpoint. Second, upon triggering an integration event, the Unleash server executes Addon.fetchRetry, initiating an outbound HTTP request from inside its network boundary to the specified target URL.\nThird, the attacker utilizes the integration event status returned by the application as a blind probing oracle to infer the reachability and state of internal network resources.\nFinally, the server forwards sensitive data, including Authorization headers, customHeaders, and DD-API-KEY values, directly to the attacker-observed host, while delivering the internal feature-event JSON body to arbitrary internal services.\nVulnerable components include the addon and integration subsystem, specifically src/lib/addons/webhook.ts and src/lib/addons/addon.ts across the affected product versions."
}