Description

Use after free in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.0",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T17:18:31.287Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T17:18:31.287Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A use-after-free vulnerability exists within the Windows Kernel, enabling locally authenticated threat actors to execute arbitrary code and elevate their privileges.\nThe flaw specifically impacts the Windows Kernel component, where improper management of dynamic memory allocation and object lifecycles leads to dangling pointers.\nAn authorized local attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can achieve kernel-level code execution, completely bypassing standard operating system security controls and gaining SYSTEM-level privileges.\nThe risk implications are severe, as successful exploitation compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the underlying host machine.\nRequired attacker capabilities include local access to the target system and the ability to execute code. Although authorization is required, standard user privileges are sufficient to initiate the attack flow.\nExploitation requirements depend on the attacker's ability to manipulate kernel heap allocations to reclaim the freed memory address with controlled malicious data, thereby achieving arbitrary read/write primitives or control flow hijacking.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability is a use-after-free condition residing in the Windows Kernel memory management subsystem.\nA use-after-free occurs when the application or kernel continues to use a pointer after the memory object it references has been deallocated or freed.\nIf the dangling pointer is dereferenced subsequently without proper nullification or state validation, it can lead to memory corruption or unpredictable program behavior.\nThe vulnerable component is the Windows Kernel, specifically handling object references and lifetime synchronization across internal system calls or driver interfaces.\nAffected versions encompass vulnerable builds of the Windows Kernel as implied by the operating system architecture.\nAuthentication requirements dictate that the attacker must have a valid local user session on the target system.\nPrivilege requirements stipulate that the attacker starts with standard, unprivileged user access locally.\nNetwork exposure is non-existent, as the vulnerability requires local execution and cannot be triggered remotely over a network protocol.\nThe attack flow proceeds in several sequential steps: first, the attacker interacts with the kernel through documented system calls or device IOCTLs to allocate a specific kernel object in memory.\nSecond, the attacker triggers a condition or sequence of operations causing the kernel to prematurely free the target object while retaining a reference pointer to its memory address, creating a dangling pointer.\nThird, the attacker leverages heap spraying or precise heap grooming techniques to allocate new data controlled by the attacker into the exact memory location previously occupied by the freed kernel object.\nFourth, when the kernel accesses the dangling pointer, it interacts with the attacker-controlled data instead of the original valid object.\nThis payload behavior allows the attacker to redirect function pointers, overwrite critical kernel structures, or corrupt security descriptors.\nThe post-exploitation impact culminates in local privilege escalation, allowing the execution of arbitrary payloads with SYSTEM-level privileges, installation of persistent kernel-mode rootkits, and total compromise of the host operating system."
}