Description

Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T17:18:25.347Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T17:18:25.347Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability is classified as an untrusted pointer dereference within the Windows Kernel.\nThe primary impact of successful exploitation is local privilege escalation, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated kernel-level privileges.\nThe affected system is the Windows Kernel across unspecified supported versions.\nThe risk implications are severe, as a compromised kernel grants total control over the underlying operating system, bypassing standard security boundaries and access controls.\nAttacker capabilities require local access to the target system.\nExploitation requirements dictate that the attacker must already be authorized or authenticated locally on the system with the ability to execute low-privileged code to interact with the vulnerable kernel component.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from inadequate validation of pointer values supplied by user-mode applications to the Windows Kernel. Specifically, the kernel fails to properly sanitize or validate an untrusted pointer before dereferencing it within a kernel-mode routine.\nThe vulnerable component resides within the core architecture of the Windows Kernel, specifically handling system calls or IOCTLs that process user-supplied memory references.\nAuthentication requirements dictate that the attacker must have local access to the system, but the vulnerability can be triggered from a low-privileged execution context.\nPrivilege requirements are minimal for initiation, as the attacker only needs standard user privileges to execute the initial payload locally.\nNetwork exposure is non-existent, as the attack surface is strictly local and cannot be leveraged remotely over a network interface.\nThe attack flow begins when a locally authenticated attacker executes a custom-crafted application designed to interact with the vulnerable kernel driver or system service.\nThe attacker passes an untrusted, manipulated pointer reference into the kernel via an inter-process communication mechanism, system call, or input-output control request.\nDue to the absence of proper bounds checking and pointer validation checks within the kernel logic, the operating system attempts to dereference the attacker-controlled memory address directly.\nBy carefully manipulating the memory layout and supplying a controlled pointer, the attacker can redirect execution flow or corrupt kernel memory structures.\nPost-exploitation impact includes the attainment of SYSTEM-level privileges, enabling the attacker to disable security controls, install persistent rootkits, access sensitive kernel memory, and compromise the complete integrity and confidentiality of the host operating system."
}