Description

Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Bind Filter Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T17:18:23.050Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T17:18:23.050Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability is classified as a heap-based buffer overflow affecting the Windows Bind Filter Driver.\nThe flaw allows an authorized local attacker to execute arbitrary code within kernel context, directly resulting in local privilege escalation.\nThe affected system component is the Windows Bind Filter Driver, which handles specific bind operations and network filter communications at a low operating system level.\nThe risk implications are severe, as successful exploitation compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the host operating system, granting the adversary the highest level of execution privileges.\nAttacker capabilities are strictly constrained to local execution, meaning the adversary must already possess valid credentials and the ability to execute code locally on the target system.\nExploitation requirements necessitate that the attacker is authorized to interact with the vulnerable driver interface, supplying crafted input parameters that exceed allocated heap memory bounds during memory copy or buffer allocation routines.",
  "technicalDetails": "The root cause of the vulnerability stems from improper bounds checking within the Windows Bind Filter Driver when processing input data supplied from user-mode to kernel-mode via Input/Output Control (IOCTL) or similar communication mechanisms.\nSpecifically, the vulnerable component fails to adequately validate the size of data buffers before copying them into dynamically allocated kernel heap memory structures.\nThis memory corruption flaw manifests as a heap-based buffer overflow, where an attacker can write past the boundaries of an allocated heap chunk, overwriting adjacent heap metadata or critical kernel objects.\nThe attack flow begins with an authorized local attacker acquiring a handle to the vulnerable driver using standard Win32 APIs such as CreateFile.\nThe attacker then formulates a malicious payload containing oversized input data designed to trigger the unsafe memory copy operation within the driver's dispatch routines or internal handler functions.\nUpon sending this crafted payload via device control requests, the driver allocates an insufficient heap buffer and subsequently copies the excessive input data into it.\nThe resulting heap overflow corrupts adjacent heap structures, allowing the adversary to manipulate kernel memory layout.\nBy carefully engineering the heap layout and corruption data, the attacker can hijack execution flow, overwrite function pointers, or manipulate kernel data structures associated with security tokens.\nAuthentication requirements dictate that the user must be logged onto the local system, and privilege requirements specify that the attacker must have authorization to interact with the device driver, though high administrative privileges may not be strictly required initially if standard users can open device handles.\nThe network exposure is entirely local, as the attack vector requires local execution and cannot be exploited remotely.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes complete compromise of the Windows operating system kernel, enabling the attacker to bypass security controls, install persistent rootkits, access sensitive kernel memory, and escalate privileges to NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM."
}