Description

Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Device Association Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T17:18:20.993Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T17:18:20.993Z",
  "executiveSummary": "This vulnerability is a heap-based buffer overflow affecting the Windows Device Association Service. The flaw enables an authorized local attacker to achieve privilege escalation by executing arbitrary code with elevated permissions. The affected component is responsible for managing and associating devices with the Windows operating system. Successful exploitation compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the host system. The attack requires local system access and authentication, implying that the adversary must already possess an execution context on the target machine. Risk implications are severe, as local privilege escalation typically facilitates lateral movement, persistence establishment, and complete system compromise in enterprise environments. Mitigation requires the application of official vendor patches when available, along with strict adherence to the principle of least privilege to restrict unauthorized local execution and limit the operational impact of potential compromise vectors.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the Windows Device Association Service, specifically within memory management routines that handle dynamic data structures. The root cause is a classic heap-based buffer overflow, stemming from inadequate bounds checking and insufficient size validation when processing input data supplied to the service. When the vulnerable component allocates memory on the heap to store device association payloads or configuration attributes, it fails to accurately calculate the requisite buffer size or properly restrict the volume of incoming data, leading to a heap corruption condition.\nExploitation requires the attacker to have an authorized local foothold on the target Windows system. The attack flow begins with the adversary crafting a malicious payload designed to interact with the Windows Device Association Service via local Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanisms, such as Local Procedure Calls (LPC) or named pipes exposed by the service. By sending a specially crafted sequence of requests containing oversized data blocks, the attacker forces the service to write past the boundaries of the allocated heap chunk. This overflows adjacent heap metadata or critical application data structures.\nThrough careful heap manipulation and grooming, the attacker can overwrite adjacent heap chunks with controlled data. This malicious payload can manipulate function pointers, virtual method tables, or object instances residing in heap memory. When the application subsequently invokes these corrupted pointers or processes the manipulated objects, execution flow is redirected to attacker-controlled shellcode or malicious instructions. Because the Windows Device Association Service executes with high privileges, successfully redirecting execution flow grants the adversary immediate privilege escalation to these elevated security contexts.\nThe network exposure of this vulnerability is strictly local, as the attack vector requires local interaction with the service interfaces. No remote network vector is inherently required for exploitation. The payload behavior involves executing commands or injecting malicious code into secure system contexts, bypassing standard access controls. Post-exploitation impact includes full administrative control over the operating system, installation of persistent backdoors, tampering with system configurations, and potential compromise of interconnected network domains."
}