Description

Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in Booktics <= 1.0.24 versions.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "5.3",
  "pubDate": "2026-09-11T19:17:44.877Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-09-11T19:17:44.877Z",
  "executiveSummary": "The vulnerability identified in Booktics versions <= 1.0.24 is classified as an Unauthenticated Broken Access Control flaw.\nThis vulnerability allows unauthorized actors to bypass security constraints and interact with restricted functionalities within the plugin without requiring valid authentication.\nThe impact of this vulnerability is critical, as it potentially grants an attacker unauthorized access to sensitive data, administrative actions, or plugin configurations.\nThe flaw affects the security boundary of the Booktics product, exposing the host system to unauthorized management or manipulation.\nSuccessful exploitation does not require prior authentication or elevated privileges, significantly lowering the barrier for entry for remote attackers.\nThe risk is exacerbated by the ability to interact with the plugin's backend logic, which may lead to total compromise of the plugin's functionality and data integrity.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides in the core access control logic of the Booktics plugin for versions 1.0.24 and below. The root cause is the absence of sufficient authorization checks in sensitive API endpoints or action handlers. Specifically, the plugin fails to validate the current user's session or role-based access control (RBAC) tokens before executing privileged requests.\nIn a standard WordPress plugin architecture, functionality exposed via 'wp_ajax' or 'wp_ajax_nopriv' hooks must implement strict nonce validation and user capability checks using 'current_user_can()'. The Booktics plugin fails to enforce these checks on affected endpoints, allowing unauthenticated requests to reach administrative handlers.\nThe attack flow proceeds as follows: An attacker identifies an exposed endpoint within the Booktics plugin that performs administrative or sensitive operations. By crafting a direct HTTP request to these endpoints—bypassing the intended frontend interface—the attacker can trigger backend functions that modify plugin settings, alter appointment data, or manipulate user configurations.\nBecause the server-side code does not distinguish between an authenticated administrator and an unauthenticated external request, the backend logic proceeds to execute the requested command as if it were a legitimate administrative action. This lack of input authorization validation is a failure in the application's security model.\nThe exploitation method involves sending specially crafted HTTP GET or POST requests to the vulnerable handler. If the specific handler is exposed via a public-facing hook, no interaction with the WordPress authentication system is required. The payload behavior is limited only by the functions implemented in the vulnerable component; if the component handles database operations or file system writes, the attacker can leverage these capabilities to achieve persistent control or data exfiltration.\nThe post-exploitation impact includes unauthorized access to customer records, appointment management, potential configuration changes that could redirect bookings, or the escalation of malicious activity within the WordPress environment. Given that the vulnerability exists at the plugin level, the scope of impact remains confined to the data and functionality managed by Booktics, though this can serve as a vector for further system-wide exploitation depending on the environment configuration."
}