Description

Use after free in Windows Bind Filter Driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Executive Summary

Technical Details

Mitigations

References

Additional Metadata

{
  "score": "7.8",
  "pubDate": "2026-08-11T17:18:16.473Z",
  "pubdate": "2026-08-11T17:18:16.473Z",
  "executiveSummary": "A use-after-free vulnerability exists in the Windows Bind Filter Driver, presenting significant security risks to local operating system environments.\nThe vulnerability class is classified as a use-after-free weakness, which typically arises when memory is referenced after it has been deallocated, leading to unpredictable behavior, memory corruption, or arbitrary code execution.\nThe primary impact of successful exploitation is local privilege escalation, allowing a threat actor to elevate their access rights on the target system.\nThe affected product is the Windows Bind Filter Driver. Risk implications are severe, as an attacker who successfully exploits this flaw can execute arbitrary code in the context of a privileged user or kernel mode, potentially compromising the entire operating system.\nAttacker capabilities require local access to the target machine.\nExploitation requirements dictate that the attacker must already be an authorized user on the system with the ability to execute code locally, subsequently leveraging the flaw to escalate privileges beyond their assigned authorization level.",
  "technicalDetails": "The vulnerability resides within the Windows Bind Filter Driver, specifically involving memory management operations within the driver's execution context.\nThe root cause is a use-after-free condition, where the driver fails to properly nullify or manage object pointers after releasing the underlying memory allocation. When subsequent operations attempt to access the freed memory region, a race condition or deterministic reuse of the dangling pointer can be leveraged.\nThe vulnerable component is the kernel-mode driver responsible for handling bind filter operations within the Windows networking or filtering subsystem.\nAuthentication requirements dictate that the attacker must possess valid local execution capabilities on the host. Privilege requirements specify that the attacker starts with unprivileged or lower-privilege access and attempts to leverage the flaw to achieve local privilege escalation.\nNetwork exposure is strictly local, as the attack surface requires local execution and cannot be triggered remotely over a network interface.\nThe step-by-step attack flow begins with the local attacker interacting with the Windows Bind Filter Driver through documented or undocumented device control input/output (IOCTL) interfaces or API calls. By carefully orchestrating object creation, deletion, and subsequent heap allocation patterns, the attacker forces the driver to reference a dangling pointer pointing to a previously freed memory block.\nThrough heap feng shui or similar memory grooming techniques, the attacker replaces the freed memory contents with controlled payload data or malicious function pointers. When the driver dereferences the dangling pointer, it executes attacker-controlled data or instructions.\nThe payload behavior results in arbitrary code execution within the kernel or a privileged service context, depending on where the vulnerable routine executes. The post-exploitation impact includes complete local compromise, ability to bypass security controls, installation of persistent kernel-level malware, and full administrative control over the affected Windows operating system."
}